On Syrian Chemical Weapons

Perhaps the biggest news of the day is Josh Rogin's bombshell-ish report in Foreign Policy's "The Cable" that the US State Department believes chemical weapons have been used by the Assad regime.  The weapons were allegedly deployed, as originally reported by al-Jazeera, against rebel/opposition forces in the city of Homs on December 23, 2012.

As Mr. Rogin reports:

A secret State Department cable has concluded that the Syrian military likely used chemical weapons against its own people in a deadly attack last month . . .

United States diplomats in Turkey conducted a previously undisclosed, intensive investigation into claims that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons, and made what an Obama administration official who reviewed the cable called a "compelling case" that Assad's military forces had used a deadly form of poison gas.

. . .

The report confirms the worst fears of officials who are frustrated by the current policy, which is to avoid any direct military assistance to the Syrian rebels and limit U.S. aid to sporadic deliveries of humanitarian and communications equipment.

Many believe that Assad is testing U.S. red lines.

Of course, as Mr. Rogin notes, if the contents of this State Department Memo are true, then this puts the Obama Administration in a bit of a bind.  Back in August, President Obama declared that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would be a "red line" for the United States - one which could "significantly" alter his "calculus" as to what the US role in the Syrian conflict should be:

So . . . now the question becomes: what will the Administration's response be to this memo?  As the Obama Administration prepares to expand its air and logistical support for France's military foray into Mali, is there really any willingness to open up yet another can of worms by getting further involved in Syria - particularly when a significant majority of the American public disapproves of US involvement in the conflict?  We can only wait and see.

Alleged Chemical Weapon Activity:

According to Mr. Rogin's report on "The Cable," the chemical weapon allegedly deployed by the Assad regime is known as Agent 15 - a shorthand for 3-Quinuclidinyl Benzilate, which is also known by the even short acronym "BZ."  Unlike many chemical weapons - such as, for instance, mustard gas or sarin - BZ is an incapacitating, rather than toxic or lethal, agent.  Note that this does not mean that BZ is necessarily non-lethal.  As Charles Edward Stewart notes in his book Weapons of Mass Casualties and Terrorism Response: Handbook, even relatively low doses of BZ (and similar chemical agents) can result in death from hyperthermia - death from an elevated internal body temperature (e.g. the opposite of hypothermia):

Hyperthermia is a serious effect of poisoning with BZ. . . . . Death from relatively low doses of anticholinergies such as atropine or BZ has occurred as a result of the impairment of sweating. (pg. 69)

Because one of the effects of a significantly high dose of BZ is to cause the victim to slip into a coma, I imagine - but by no means know, since I'm not a doctor, chemist, or have any other specialized knowledge of medicine/chemicals - that a significantly high dose could, theoretically, induce a coma from which the victim would never awaken. ( <== This is conjecture; maybe someone more knowledgeable can correct me?)

However, for the most part, BZ is considered a non-lethal agent.  It has been tested on human subjects in the past, and, indeed, the US Army is alleged to have conducted BZ tests on human subjects during the '50s, '60s, and early '70s.  (NOTE: for the scientific-minded among you, here is a PDF copy of an Army research report on BZ chemical reactions, written in 1964).  For a somewhat medically technical, but otherwise fairly decent, description:

3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (QNB, BZ) is an anticholinergic agent that affects both the peripheral and central nervous systems (CNS). It is one of the most potent anticholinergic psychomimetics known, with only small doses necessary to produce incapacitation. ... Effects of QNB by any route of exposure are slow in onset and long in duration. The onset of action is approximately 1 hour, with peak effects occurring 8 hours postexposure. Symptoms gradually subside over 2-4 days. (National Library of Medicine, Toxicology Data Network)

Thus, as can be seen, the general medical description of BZ supposes an effect that is non-lethal and wears off in a matter of days.

BZ affects both the peripheral and central nervous systems of exposed victims, causing:

• Peripheral Nervous System: dryness of the mouth and skin, blurred vision, flushing of the skin, hyperthermia (as sweat glands cease function, see above)
• Central Nervous System: mental status changes (delusions, hallucinations, disorientation, etc.), decline in physical coordination and slurred speech, variations in level of consciousness (allegedly ranging from drowsiness to coma)

All in all, BZ is an unpleasant and dangerous, but not necessarily deadly chemical weapon.  Its effectiveness lies in its ability to incapacitate one's enemies - preventing them from fighting by causing the symptoms described above.  

If, indeed, the Assad regime deployed BZ in Homs this past December, this is a terrible and significant escalation of the Syrian conflict.  However, we - and the Syrian opposition members affected - should consider ourselves lucky.  BZ/Agent 15 is by no means the most frightening weapon in Assad's chemical arsenal.  Assad has others that are far more deadly and far more gruesome. 

The real danger underlying the State Department memo described by Mr. Rogin is precisely what is mentioned in the article: the possibility that Assad could be "testing U.S. red lines."  If this is the case, and if the US response is not sufficiently sharp, then the next time Assad deploys chemical weapons, they may very well be more than mere incapacitating agents.

Assad's Non-Conflict-Ending Speech

Today in Damascus, Bashar al-Assad gave a defiant speech at the city's opera house, ostensibly to offer a plan to resolve the ongoing conflict/civil war that has been roiling Syria for the past 20 months.  Assad's "plan," however, seemed largely divorced from the reality of the situation in Syria, the demands of the opposition, or the hopes of international observers.  As the New York Times notes:

"[Mr. Assad] offered no new acknowledgment of the gains by the rebels fighting against him, the excesses of his government or the aspirations of the Syrian people. Mr. Assad also ruled out talks with the armed opposition and pointedly ignored its central demand that he step down . . . ."

Indeed, Assad used most of his speech to attack the Syrian opposition, reiterating the regime's propaganda line that the opposition groups are made up of "foreigners," "terrorists," and "takfiris."  The Syrian dictator asserted that, "[b]ecause takfiri thought is strange to our country, they [the Syrian opposition] had to import it from abroad, whether in terrorists or thought [sic.] . . . Thus, takfiris, terrorists, Qaeda members calling themselves jihadis streamed from everywhere to command the combat operations on the ground."

Assad seemed to cut off the possibility of negotiations with most of the Syrian opposition groups, stating that "[w]e will have dialogue with all parties and individuals that did not sell our country to the foreigner" and wondering "with whom shall we dialogue - those who are carrying extremist thinking, and do not believe [in anything] except [] blood, killing and terrorism?"

In terms of ending the conflict, Assad offered a three-stage plan with various sub-parts.  We're just going to block-quote it from the somewhat jumbled English translation published by the Lebanon Daily Star:

"The first stage: First of all, regional and foreign countries must stop funding, arming and harbouring militants at the same time that gunmen stop all terrorist operations in order to ease the return of displaced Syrians to their original homes in safety and security.

Immediately after that, all military operations by our armed forces will stop, though they will reserve the right to respond in the case of attack on the security of the nation or residents or public and private property.

Second, a mechanism will be created to ensure commitment to all previous agreements for controlling the borders.

Third, the current government will immediately begin intensive communications with all elements of Syrian society, its parties and organisations...It will hold a national dialogue conference that all forces interested in a solution in Syria can participate in.

The second stage: First, the current government will hold a comprehensive national dialogue to reach a national pact that commits to the sovereignty of Syria and the unity and peace of its territory and the rejection of intervention in its affairs and the rejection of terrorism and violence in all its forms.

This pact is what will outline the political future of Syria and will propose a new constitutional and legal system along with its political and economic features. It will agree on new laws for parties, elections and local administration.

Second, the national pact will be sent for popular referendum.

Third, an expanded government will be formed, which includes all elements of Syrian society and it will implement the articles of the pact.

Fourth, the new constitution will be put to popular referendum and after it is confirmed, the expanded government will use the new agreed laws from the pact and the new constitution and will run new parliamentary elections.

The third stage will be the forming of a new government according to the constitution.

Second, a truth and reconciliation conference will be held and a general amnesty will be issued for all those arrested because of the events, in keeping with civil law.

Third will be the work towards rehabilitating infrastructure and rebuilding and compensation to citizens hurt by events."

Yeah . . . Anyway, in other words, if you were looking for a quick and/or comparatively bloodless plan for ending the Syrian conflict, you ain't going to find it here.  No surprises there.  But it really seems like Assad still hasn't read the writing on the wall and is willing to continue sticking to his guns - literally.  Expect more bloodshed, greater conflict, and a continuously rising death toll.  As expected, members of the Syrian opposition have sharply criticized the speech, and it is unlikely to have any immediate effect on the fighting/killing going on on the ground.

Also, here is the full video of the speech, courtesy of (*gag*) PressTV: