Several Interesting Videos from Syria Over the Weekend

Not much time to write anything, but here are several videos out of/about Syria from over the weekend.

Assad's Non-Conflict-Ending Speech

Today in Damascus, Bashar al-Assad gave a defiant speech at the city's opera house, ostensibly to offer a plan to resolve the ongoing conflict/civil war that has been roiling Syria for the past 20 months.  Assad's "plan," however, seemed largely divorced from the reality of the situation in Syria, the demands of the opposition, or the hopes of international observers.  As the New York Times notes:

"[Mr. Assad] offered no new acknowledgment of the gains by the rebels fighting against him, the excesses of his government or the aspirations of the Syrian people. Mr. Assad also ruled out talks with the armed opposition and pointedly ignored its central demand that he step down . . . ."

Indeed, Assad used most of his speech to attack the Syrian opposition, reiterating the regime's propaganda line that the opposition groups are made up of "foreigners," "terrorists," and "takfiris."  The Syrian dictator asserted that, "[b]ecause takfiri thought is strange to our country, they [the Syrian opposition] had to import it from abroad, whether in terrorists or thought [sic.] . . . Thus, takfiris, terrorists, Qaeda members calling themselves jihadis streamed from everywhere to command the combat operations on the ground."

Assad seemed to cut off the possibility of negotiations with most of the Syrian opposition groups, stating that "[w]e will have dialogue with all parties and individuals that did not sell our country to the foreigner" and wondering "with whom shall we dialogue - those who are carrying extremist thinking, and do not believe [in anything] except [] blood, killing and terrorism?"

In terms of ending the conflict, Assad offered a three-stage plan with various sub-parts.  We're just going to block-quote it from the somewhat jumbled English translation published by the Lebanon Daily Star:

"The first stage: First of all, regional and foreign countries must stop funding, arming and harbouring militants at the same time that gunmen stop all terrorist operations in order to ease the return of displaced Syrians to their original homes in safety and security.

Immediately after that, all military operations by our armed forces will stop, though they will reserve the right to respond in the case of attack on the security of the nation or residents or public and private property.

Second, a mechanism will be created to ensure commitment to all previous agreements for controlling the borders.

Third, the current government will immediately begin intensive communications with all elements of Syrian society, its parties and organisations...It will hold a national dialogue conference that all forces interested in a solution in Syria can participate in.

The second stage: First, the current government will hold a comprehensive national dialogue to reach a national pact that commits to the sovereignty of Syria and the unity and peace of its territory and the rejection of intervention in its affairs and the rejection of terrorism and violence in all its forms.

This pact is what will outline the political future of Syria and will propose a new constitutional and legal system along with its political and economic features. It will agree on new laws for parties, elections and local administration.

Second, the national pact will be sent for popular referendum.

Third, an expanded government will be formed, which includes all elements of Syrian society and it will implement the articles of the pact.

Fourth, the new constitution will be put to popular referendum and after it is confirmed, the expanded government will use the new agreed laws from the pact and the new constitution and will run new parliamentary elections.

The third stage will be the forming of a new government according to the constitution.

Second, a truth and reconciliation conference will be held and a general amnesty will be issued for all those arrested because of the events, in keeping with civil law.

Third will be the work towards rehabilitating infrastructure and rebuilding and compensation to citizens hurt by events."

Yeah . . . Anyway, in other words, if you were looking for a quick and/or comparatively bloodless plan for ending the Syrian conflict, you ain't going to find it here.  No surprises there.  But it really seems like Assad still hasn't read the writing on the wall and is willing to continue sticking to his guns - literally.  Expect more bloodshed, greater conflict, and a continuously rising death toll.  As expected, members of the Syrian opposition have sharply criticized the speech, and it is unlikely to have any immediate effect on the fighting/killing going on on the ground.

Also, here is the full video of the speech, courtesy of (*gag*) PressTV:

On the Egyptian Economy

In the aftermath of the events surrounding the writing, protesting, voting, and passage of Egypt's new constitution, the Egyptian economy has once again taken center stage.  And the news, it seems, just keeps getting worse.

Now, I will warn you up front that, as a law student, I'm no economist.  In the field of economics, I know the supply and demand curve and that magic little point right where the lines intersect that's supposed to be the optimal level of production.  The rest is so much voodoo floating far, far over my head.  Which is why this post isn't focusing too much on analysis, put on providing information I've read in the news . . .

First, it's been well established that the Egyptian economy - which, according to those magical economists, was never exceptionally strong - took a major hit in the aftermath of the 25 January Revolution.  Political turmoil is never good for business, and Egypt was no exception: for instance, the country's foreign international reserves have fallen from $36 billion in December 2010 to $15 billion earlier this month.  As the Wall Street Journal writes, this is "barely enough to cover three months of imports—the minimum the IMF recommends for its members."

Within the last couples weeks/couple days, Egypt's economy suffered several new blows:

• Early December 2012: the political strife engendered by the drafting of Egypt's constitution and the politicking, popular protesting, and campaigning that characterized the couple weeks between its drafting and the constitutional referendum on December 15/22 resulted in the postponement of negotiations for a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  This unrest also caused President Morsi and the Egyptian government to cancel proposed austerity measures and tax increases.
• December 23, 2012: Standard & Poors' (S&P) cut Egypt's long-term sovereign rating from a "B" to a "B-" (while leaving the country's short-term rating at a "B" for both foreign and local currency debt).  Additionally, S&P "kept its negative outlook on the rating - suggesting it sees another cut as the most likely next move."

And now, today, another bit of bad news: the Egyptian pound has fallen to an eight-year low against the U.S. dollar.

Again, I'm no economist.  So for an analysis of these economic indicators and their potential effects on Egypt's citizens, the economies of other Middle Eastern countries, etc. you should probably ask someone who understands all of this significantly better than I do.  That said, here are some more links on the Egyptian economy that you may find useful:

• Morsi's Next Move: Egypt's President Got His Constitution, but Can He Fix the Economy? (Time World)
• "Guide to the End of the World (Or, Explainer on Currency Devaluation)" re: Egypt (Rebel Economy)
• Egypt Not on the Verge of Bankruptcy, Says PM (Egypt Independent)
• Egypt Reserves Plunge as Economic Crisis Bites (Reuters)
• Egypt's Economy: The Downside to Growth (Foreign Policy) (NOTE: this article is about the Egyptian economy more generally, and offers some historical context for what is currently going on; it is also several weeks old)

What is the al-Nusra Front? (Part 2 - What Has the Group Done?)

Continuing our discussion of the al-Nusra Front, we'll now turn from a more general discussion of the group and its mysterious leadership to its actions and its growing strength within the cadre of Syrian rebel groups fighting against the Assad regime.

What Has the al-Nusra Front Done?
Early in the year, during the first weeks/months of the al-Nusra Front's existence, it is somewhat difficult to determine precisely what attacks the group was responsible for.  Indeed, because some of the early attacks that were later claimed by, or attributed to, the al-Nusra Front - for instance, a suicide bombing of a trio of buses carrying Syrian riot police in a Damascus neighborhood in early January - occurred before the group was well known, rumors were rampant that al-Nusra was, in fact, a front created by the Syrian government to discredit the Free Syrian Army and other rebel factions.

Regardless of the truth or falsity of al-Nusra's claims on early attacks, the rest of 2012 demonstrated the group's grim expertise, its power, and it authenticity.

For a more complete list of (claimed) attacks by the al-Nusra Front than you will ever likely need, I'd recommend consulting the group's Arabic-language statements, which have been gathered on the Jihadology blog by the inimitable Aaron Zelin.  However, the following is but a brief list of al-Nusra's most significant attacks:

• May 29, 2012: al-Nusra claimed responsibility for the mass-execution of 13 people in Deir Ezzor.  (NOTE: al-Nusra was also allegedly responsible for further such massacres in Deir Ezzor later in the year, such as this video from early December that supposedly shows al-Nusra fighters executing bound captives).
• October 3, 2012: al-Nusra claimed responsibility for a triple suicide car-bombing in Aleppo's Sa'adallah al-Jabiri Square.  The group claimed to be targeting Syrian command centers at a nearby officer's club, two hotels, and the local municipal offices.
• Early October 2012: al-Nusra allegedly partnered with the Free Syrian Army to seize control of an airbase in al-Ta'aneh outside of Aleppo.  This joint operation supposedly allowed the group to obtain a number of anti-aircraft missiles.
• Early December 2012: al-Nusra and several associated Islamist groups seized control of the Sheik Suleiman military base outside of Aleppo.  Allegedly, this base houses a scientific research facility connected to Syria's chemical weapons program.

Additionally, here is a map depicting the locations and relative frequency of al-Nusra's attacks between January and September 2012:

Source: Elizabeth O'Bagy, "Jihad in Syria," Middle East Security Report 6, September 2012.

Finally, the al-Nusra Front's terrorist output is prolific.  The group has claimed credit for hundreds of attacks, large and small - ranging from small-arms battles and attacks on traffic checkpoints to major suicide or car/truck bombings - including, in one instance, claiming credit for forty-five (45) attacks in four separate Syrian provinces in a single day.  In total, al-Nusra is allegedly responsible for nearly 600 attacks against Syrian forces and Assad loyalists since November 2011 (Time Magazine and State Department Press Statement Designating al-Nusra as a Terrorist Organization).

And . . . I was going to make this post a bit longer and discuss the importance of the al-Nusra Front within the larger context of the Syrian conflict/civil-war, but . . . I think this is long enough for now.

What is the al-Nusra Front? (Part 1)

As the Syrian conflict/civil-war continues to spiral into a bloodier and bloodier mess, I want to take a moment to write about a group that is playing a central role in the conflict: Jabhat al-Nusra (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام), aka the al-Nusra Front. The al-Nusra Front was big news about a week ago when the US government designated the group as a terrorist organization.

So what is the al-Nusra Front?  Who are its members?  And what is the role that the group has played, is playing, and may eventually play in the larger Syrian conflict of which it is but one small (albeit powerful) component part?

As a general introduction, the al-Nusra Front is one of the most - if not the most - powerful factions involved in the Syrian conflict.  It was founded in January 2012.  The group's religious bent is Sunni Islamic, and its ideology is, more specifically, Salafist: as one military commander of the group has stated,

"Our first goal is to get rid of Assad. Then we want a state where the Quran is the only source of law . . . . Sharia is the right path for all humanity - all other laws make people unhappy."

Indeed, as the International Crisis group has pointed out, the al-Nusra Front views the deposition of Bashar al-Assad and his regime as "only half the battle."  Full success for al-Nusra will "come only once the entire regime was replaced with an Islamic state following Salafi principles."  (See International Crisis Group, "Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition").

Leader(s): The leaders of the al-Nusra Front are largely unknown.  An unidentified man using the nom de guerre of Al-Fateh Abu Muhammad al-Jolani (transliteration differences online sometimes render this as "al-Golani," "al-Jilani," or "al-Jawlani") narrated the group's initial video release (main portion of video w/ subtitles beginning around 4:02), announcing its formation, describing the rationale for its coming to Syria, and outlining its aims. Al-Jolani has been identified as the al-Nusra Front's leader, or, in some instances, as its "General Secretary."  Whatever that means.  I don't have a picture of this mysterious al-Jolani to show you. Sorry.  Or maybe I do . . . here's a picture of general khafiya-clad al-Nusra Front members from their video.  Maybe he's one of them - like, say, black-hooded-executioner-guy in the bottom corner?

The number and identities of other senior al-Nusra Front officers are equally unknown.  Allegedly, however, much of the top leadership is made up of non-Syrians: specifically, Lebanese and Palestinian militants - some of whom are linked to the Palestinian Fatah al-Islam organization.  This analysis of al-Nusra's leadership seems to have found some level of confirmation from the testimony of Syrian fighters who have fought or interacted with the al-Nusra Front in various ways.  For instance:

A rebel soldier who briefly joined JN [e.g. Jabhat al-Nusra] before opting to join with the rebel Suqour al-Sham Brigade stated that, "Most of the young men I worked with were Syrian revolutionaries who joined JN because they were stronger and more effective. Yes we are mujahideen, but we didn’t think of it as al-Qaeda."  He added, "There was a lot of secrecy surrounding the leadership.  I left JN when I discovered that many of the leaders were not Syrian but Lebanese or Palestinians that used to work with the Syrian intelligence agencies."

 The general consensus is that the ranks of the al-Nusra Front's leadership are filled with a number of experienced jihadists who have fought on various battlefields throughout the Arab World and Central Asia.

I am going to cut this off here for length purposes, but will post more on al-Nusra within the next several days.