Terror in Boston

As anyone with a newsfeed or a television probably knows by now, two bombs exploded earlier today near the finish line of the Boston Marathon - and at least three more (the Wall Street Journal is reporting *five* more) unexploded bombs were discovered by police along the marathon route.  The perpetrators of the attack are currently unknown, and the void has been filled by the ideologically-driven speculation of Tweeps and pundits: the usual host of anti-Islam bloggers (Pamela Geller, Robert Spencer) has already labeled the attack "Jihad in Boston," while the more left-wing hosts of several major cable news program (Wolf Blitzer, Chris Matthews), as well as "progressive" filmmaker Michael Moore, have speculated that the attacks may be the work of domestic, right-wing terrorists protesting tax day.  In other words, plenty of people have (somewhat ghoulishly) taken the opportunity to begin beating their own favorite whipping boy(s).

Regardless of who perpetrated this atrocity, what occurred in Boston today was horrific. In the words of one witness:

“These runners just finished and they don’t have legs now. . . . So many of them. There are so many people without legs. It’s all blood. There’s blood everywhere. You got bones, fragments. It’s disgusting. It’s like a war zone.”

While CNN is reporting that an initial examination of the bombs reveals them to be fairly crude, the two explosives that were successfully detonated were apparently packed with ball-bearings - a common method of increasing the amount of shrapnel "spray" produced by an explosion, and, thus, a way to maximize injuries/casualties. While there is, as yet, no final word on the number of casualties from the Boston attack, the current casualty count is 2 dead and 132 injured, with 10 people requiring limb amputations.

Further complicating the story today were reports of either a fire or explosion of some kind at the John F. Kennedy Library in Dorchester, MA. While this initially appeared to be connected to the bombings at the Marathon, local police seemed to have walked this back.... It is currently unclear what caused the fire/damage to the library or whether it was in some way connected to the terrorist bombings.

I'm sure that more information will continue to become available . . .

Here is a video of attack released by the Boston Globe. WARNING: it is horrific. You can hear the second explosion occur at approximately 0.19 seconds in.

(Don't Fear) The MQ-9 Reaper: The Department of Justice White Paper and the Targeted Killing of American Citizens

Disclaimer: this blog post is not meant to be a sign of support for the overarching policy of targeted-killings-by-drone that the United States has pursued in the Middle East, the Asian Subcontinent, and Africa over the past nine years.  There are certainly significant consequences to the use of drones - including civilian casualties, missed targets, and the effects of drone use on foreign public opinion - that go well beyond any strictly legal analysis of drone-based targeted killing.  That said, these issues will not be addressed in this blog post, which strictly discusses the rationale of the DoJ whitepaper that was recently released.

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Unless you've been hiding under a rock (or just busy) for the past few days, you've no doubt heard about the Department of Justice memo on targeted killing that was leaked to NBC news on Monday.  And hoo boy what a stink it's caused, especially in the Right Wing Blogosphere and among a host of (*cough* hypocritical *cough*) conservative pundits.   I mean, did you know that the Obama Administration thinks it's honkey-dorey to ASSASSINATE AMERICAN CITIZENS without DUE PROCESS?!  For all the subtlety of their headlines and arguments, the whole lot of them may as well have pooled together and said, in the immortal words of Antoine Dodson: "Hide yo' kids, hide yo' wife, and hide yo' husband, cuz they dronin' e'erbody out here."

Conservative Punditocracy to the Average American: "Do
not ask for whom the Predator drone hums . . . it hums for thee."

Source: PolicyMic, "Predator Drone Strikes"

(As an aside, left wing pundits have been no less hypocritical in their *support* for the DoJ whitepaper.  MSNBC's typically far-left punditocracy - including "people's rights come from the government" Touré, Chris "Tingles" Matthews, and Rachel Maddow - weighed in in favor of the targeted killing policy, and the network's Krystal Ball went full hack and decided to just come out and say what everyone who listened to the original MSNBC slobberfest already knew: that these same pundits would *not* have supported the *exact same* policy had it been implemented by George W. Bush. So, yes, there's plenty of hackery and hypocrisy to go around . . .)

But, back to business.  The level of hysteria over the targeted killing memo has somewhat confused me, and not just because of its mystical ability to turn cable news into a "Through the Looking Glass" topsy-turvy laugh-fest (as if it wasn't already).  This is largely because, even from reading the first page of the memo, the DoJ's central caveat is obvious: the memo *does not* provide a legal justification for the targeted killing of Americans.  It provides a legal justification for the targeted killing of Americans . . . who are operational leaders of al-Qaeda, who are residing in a foreign country, and who, for whatever reason, cannot be captured.  Which, of course, is not necessarily a good thing or a good policy.  But there is a world of difference between "The DoJ Believes the Government Can Kill American Citizens Without Due Process!" and "The DoJ Believes the Government Can Kill al-Qaeda Leaders, Who Happen to be American Citizens, with Minimal Due Process."

Literally the end of the very first paragraph of the DoJ memo.
Note the phrase "only where the following three conditions are met."

I was relieved to find that I was not the only person who picked up the distinction, and, luckily, those who did are a lot smarter and more articulate than I am.  In fact, why are you even reading this blog when you could be reading:

• "Just Calm Down About That DoJ White Paper" (Lawfare, Benjamin Wittes and Susan Hennessey)
• "Americans: If You Don’t Want To Get Killed By A Drone, Avoid These 4 Things!" (Selected Wisdom, Clint Watts) <== This post is especially brilliant.

The point is that the DoJ memo doesn't give the Obama Administration a license to kill any thought-criminal or Republican that it happens to be annoyed with this week.  It's a limited legal opinion, applied in limited circumstances, to a relatively small group of individuals.  

In fact, with the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki (who, as Clint Watts points out, was likely the very person whose targeting the DoJ white paper was written to justify) and Inspire magazine editor Samir Khan, I don't know if there are currently *any* American members of al-Qaeda who are sufficiently "senior" to fall within the white paper's definition of who could be legally targeted.  A case might be made for targeting Adam Gadahn, al-Qaeda Central's Oregon-born media advisor, spokesperson, and propagandist . . . but even this might be stretching the definition of "senior operational leader" a bit far.  While there are certainly other Americans who have joined al-Qaeda or its regional affiliates (Somalia's al-Shabaab seems to be a particularly popular choice for American terrorist wannabes, though some have found the experience to be a lot less fun than they were expecting), they are all comparatively small fry.  I would personally be curious to hear just who - if anyone - still falls within the ambit of this DoJ memo.

As for the memo's legal reasoning, well . . . it might be a little strained, but I don't think it's necessarily unreasonable.  The "Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test" referenced at several points throughout the memo is a somewhat arcane (to non-lawyers/law students) test that is very, very significant in the field of administrative law.  The test is used to determine what level of process is due to a person who is being deprived of liberty, property, or now, apparently, life resulting from the action of an administrative agency.  The test stipulates that three factors must be considered:

1. The private interest that would be effected by government actions
2. The risk of an erroneous deprivation and the likely benefit of additional procedural safeguards
3. The government's asserted interest

Typically, a less significant private interest, a low risk of erroneous deprivation, a low probability that additional procedural safeguards will lead to a greater degree of certainty with respect to an action, and a high government interest are all factors that cut in favor of a lower level of due process (for example, no constitutional requirement that a hearing take place prior to the deprivation of liberty/property).  The opposite, of course, cuts in favor of more significant procedural safeguards (e.g. pre-deprivation hearings that operate more like a traditional trial).

Now what, you might ask, does some administrative law mumbo jumbo have to do with the laws of war?  Good question, and the answer lies in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), which, as you might have noticed, is also cited throughout the DoJ white paper.  In Hamdi, a case in which an American citizen held at Guantanamo Bay sued the Bush Administration challenging his detention and demanding access to the evidence against him, the Supreme Court pulled the Mathews Test completely out of its bag of tricks (NEITHER party had cited Mathews in its briefs to the Court!) to effect a compromise between Hamdi's position and that of the US government.  Based on Hamdi's important liberty interest in, you know, not being imprisoned in Gitmo for the rest of his life and due to the moderate risk of an erroneous deprivation (e.g. was Hamdi really al-Qaeda? He, like hundreds of others, was picked up by Afghanistan's Northern Alliance and turned over to the US later...), the Court ruled that American citizens like Hamdi who were challenging their enemy combatant status need to be provided with a greater amount of due process.  Specifically, they ought to 1) receive notice of the factual basis of their classifications as enemy combatants, and 2) receive a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.  Recognizing that the Government, too, had important interests, however, the Court also ruled that at such hearings before a neutral decision-maker, there would be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government’s evidence and hearsay evidence would be allowed.  It's not a perfect decision, by any means, but it incorporated (bizarrely) a key administrative law tool into a wartime scenario, laying the groundwork for a (somewhat) more clear-cut way of making procedural due process determinations with respect to armed conflicts.

By extending the reasoning in Hamdi and applying the Mathews balancing factors, the DoJ memo is drawing two central conclusions: 1) the US Government's interest in protecting its citizens and homeland from attack outweighs the interests that American citizen "senior operational leaders of al-Qaeda" have in continuing to live and plot, and 2) the risk of erroneous targeted killings (e.g. the targeting and killing of an American citizen who is not a "senior operational leader of al-Qaeda) is low and will not be made any lower by the creation of additional procedural safeguards.  It's a pretty big jump from Hamdi, but, again, it's not completely unreasonable.  And let me reiterate that, by its very language, the memo only applies this logic to "senior operational leaders" of al-Qaeda "in a foreign country."

This, however, is where the ACTUAL arguments against the DoJ white paper can really come into play, because, at least in my opinion, the idea that additional procedural safeguards - say, the creation of a special court that reviews the evidence against an al-Qaeda leader and issues the final decision on whether to drone or not to drone - are unnecessary comes off as at once naive and a little sinister.  I'm no fan of al-Qaeda, but, if we're going to keep the drone program, I'd at least like to see a greater degree of judicial oversight with respect to who deserves to have a Hellfire missile dropped on them.

While, as I hope that I and others have shown, the average American has little to worry about with respect to the DoJ's targeted killing memo, I think that, perhaps, the memo has led to an important conversation about drones and their use (discounting, of course, the paranoid ramblings or the slobbering sycophancy of the punditocracy).  Because with John Brennan up for Director of the CIA, the US drone policy is - without the limits that a public conversation on the issue may potentially create - likely to continue apace.  Or, to put it another way: John Brennan and the counter-terror establishment have a fever . . . and currently the only prescription is more cowbell.

Torture & Art in Wars on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of "Zero Dark Thirty" and "The Battle of Algiers" (Part 2 - Battle of Algiers)

"The basis of our job is intelligence. The method: interrogation. Conducted in such a way to ensure that we always get an answer. In our situation, false humanitarian considerations can only lead to despair and confusion. I am certain that all units will understand and react accordingly."
                                                                         - Colonel Mathieu, The Battle of Algiers 

Alright, folks, we are back again for the second post in our multi-part comparison of artistic depictions of torture in Zero Dark Thirty (ZD30) and The Battle of Algiers.  This post will focus on the latter of the two films, while a discussion of ZD30 itself will largely be reserved for the next post.

Why The Battle of Algiers?
Perhaps the first question that should be asked and answered is, "why are we comparing ZD30 to The Battle of Algiers, rather than, say, 24, Homeland, or some other more modern cinematic allegory or depiction of the War on Terror?"

There are two main reasons that I selected The Battle of Algiers as the subject of this comparative analysis.  The first is fairly straightforward: unlike most of the post-9/11 films/television programs that depict or allegorize the War on Terror, The Battle of Algiers is, like ZD30, a fictionalized representation of real events.  Where ZD30 tells the story of the United States' 10-year hunt for Osama bin Laden after the September 11 terrorist attacks (which the movie bills as the "Greatest Manhunt in History"), The Battle of Algiers depicts one of the pivotal moments in the Algerian War: the titular Battle of Algiers, in which urban guerillas aligned with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) engaged in a protracted campaign of bombings and shootings against French interests in the Algerian capitol.  In response, the French dispatched General Jacques Massu and a division of French paratroopers, who restored order in the restive city through a heavy-handed campaign of coercive interrogations and torture.

And therein lies the second reason for my selection of The Battle of Algiers.  For all their differences - and, indeed, the differences between the films (to say nothing of the real-world situations that inspired them) are profound - ZD30 and The Battle of Algiers share a number of significant similarities: both concern Western nations battling terrorism and the dark extremes that even "civilized" nations will go to protect their perceived interests or accomplish their goals.  Both depict the regional environments in which the respective Western militaries or intelligence agencies must work.  Both acknowledge and depict - although with stark differences with respect to the level of sympathy induced in the viewer - the terrorist actions against which the Western nations are fighting.  And, most importantly for our purposes, the plot lines of both films are intricately bound up with the question of torture.  Indeed, this questionable theme is so significant that both ZD30 and The Battle of Algiers open with scenes involving torture.

(NOTE: for those unfamiliar with The Battle of Algiers, the entire film can currently be viewed on YouTube, although I'd get on that, since it could probably be taken down at any time as a copyright violation)

The Depiction of Torture in The Battle of Algiers:
And now we get to the meat of the matter: the depiction of torture in the The Battle of Algiers and the central role it plays in the film.

As in ZD30, the viewer know what he is getting into as soon as the movie begins: a half-naked man, beaten and dejected, sits in a French interrogation room, as a soldier speaks the film's chilling opening line, "Why couldn't you have talked sooner?  It would have gone easier for you."  The man, who is revealed to have a large burn covering the entire left part of his chest, is then pressed into a French military uniform and brought into the Casbah - the city's largest Arab quarter - to finger the location of the fighter he has given up: Ali La Pointe, the last free FLN member in the city of Algiers.

Street in Algiers' Casbah
Source: Wikimedia Commons

Notice then, what is conveyed even within the first several minutes of The Battle of Algiers: torture has not only been routinized by the French in their battle against the FLN, but, much more significantly, it is effective.  So effective, in fact, that Colonel Mathieu (a composite character representing General Massu and other French military leaders in Algeria) and his men have broken the back of the FLN's organization in Algiers.  La Pointe, betrayed by the man in the film's opening scene and trapped in his hiding place behind a false wall in an apartment bathroom, is the last loose end for the French to tie up. With his death, the French victory in the Battle of Algiers is assured.

Thus, the first several minutes of the film can be summarized in three steps: 1) Western nation tortures in pursuit of its goal; 2) this torture is effective and results in concrete leads; and 3) Western nation is able to follow these leads to achieve its goal.  To boomerang away from the Battle of Algiers for a moment, I will note that this three-step formula is, to a significant degree, a one-sentence plot summary of Zero Dark Thirty - although, admittedly, with two hours of well-developed, well-paced, and interesting detective work (punctuated by repeated al-Qaeda attacks) thrown in for good measure.

But few (decent) movies are willing to give their game away in the first few minutes, and The Battle of Algiers is no exception: the three-step formula described above may be a useful vantage point from which to view the movie's events, but it is merely the surface level of a much deeper - and much more morally convoluted - whole.  Unlike ZD30, which depicts torture as something that simply is, The Battle of Algiers provides the viewer with a much broader picture of torture.  The film examines the spiral of violence between the FLN and the French colonial police/military that led to the tactic's adoption; the physical brutality of the torture methods employed; the justifications offered by the French military; and, perhaps most importantly, the effects of the tactic on the local population and its ultimate failure to save the French colonial venture in Algeria.  This is a nuanced treatment of the question of torture in cinema, and, in the next blog post, I intend to show why ZD30 fails to live up to this thought-provoking standard.

For now, however, let us continue our examination of The Battle of Algiers.  What does the movie do right?

1) Well, for one thing, the film actually talks about torture and refuses to present the tactic as a mere fait accompli or to treat it merely as a very big and very obvious elephant in the room.  As the movie shows, the French police in Algeria were not originally in the torture business: while the police, frustrated at their inability to prevent their own officers from being gunned down by FLN assassins, certainly engaged in some despicable, extralegal tactics (the bombing of a suspected FLN member's family home, for instance) in their attempts to get FLN violence under control, torture was not among them.  However, after a series of FLN bombs kill dozens of French Algerians in near-simultaneous explosions at a restaurant, dance club, and airline ticket counter, the French substantially up their game.  Colonel Mathieu and his paratroopers are deployed to Algiers with orders to crush the FLN.  And so it is that, shortly after their arrival, the viewer is treated to this speech from Colonel Mathieu, briefing his troops on the enemy that they are charged with destroying - a speech that, if disconnected from Algeria's FLN and applied to al-Qaeda and the broader Muslim world, could easily have been given by an American military commander in the years after 9/11:

"There are 400,000 Arabs in Algiers. Are they all our enemies? We know they are not. But a small minority holds sway by means of terror and violence. We must deal with this minority in order to isolate and destroy it. It's a dangerous enemy that works in the open and underground . . . . It's a faceless enemy, unrecognizable, blending in with hundreds of others. . . . . Among all these Arab men and women are the [terrorists]. But who are they? How can we recognize them?" (NOTE: see YouTube film at 55:38 for footage)

Having explained the overarching problem that his troops will face - the problem of determining who is and is not an enemy in a native population of hundreds of thousands of individuals - Colonel Mathieu elaborates their second predicament: the FLN is structured in such a way that its members are insulated from one another.  Each member of the organization knows only three others: the higher-up that recruited that member, and two underling that that member himself recruited. In order to crack the FLN, the French paratroopers must break through this defense by working their way up the chain, eliminating the organization's "triangle" sections one by one until they reach the top: the military head of the FLN.  And how will they do this?  Colonel Mathieu has the answer: the use of what the CIA would later call "enhanced interrogation techniques" to "convince" captured FLN members to finger their immediate superiors in the organization.

"The basis of our job is intelligence. The method: interrogation. Conducted in such a way to ensure that we always get an answer. In our situation, false humanitarian considerations can only lead to despair and confusion. I am certain that all units will understand and react accordingly."

And his paratroopers do understand.  They react accordingly.  And, as the beginning of the movie shows, their tactics meet with resounding success.  But, as the video clip below (depicting a press conference between Mathieu and members of the French-Algerian media) shows, questions remain:

Colonel Mathieu is insistent that the success his troop have achieved is directly related to the tactics they have employed, and he gives the very post-9/11 dismissal to his journalist critics that, "The word 'torture' isn't used in our orders."  He goes on to detail the FLN's strategy of requiring captured members to stay silent for 24 hours after their capture so as to give the organization time to make any information they then give to French authorities useless.  "What form of questioning must we adopt [to combat these tactics?]" Mathieu asks incredulously, "Civil law procedures that take months for a mere misdemeanor?"  He then presents the assembled journalists with his stark picture of the conflict:

"The problem is this: the FLN wants to throw us out of Algeria, and we want to stay. Even with slight shades of opinion you all agree that we must stay. When the FLN rebellion began, there were no shades at all - every paper, the communist [or left-wing] press included, wanted it crushed. . . . . Therefore, it's my turn to ask a question: should France stay in Algeria? If your answer is still 'yes,' then you must accept all the necessary consequences."

It might not be much - e.g. no reporter seriously challenges the paratroopers' use of torture to put down the FLN - but it's something.  The characters in the movie recognize torture as being a subject of significance, whether from a moral or a tactical standpoint, and they discuss it!  Mathieu offers his justifications for the use of torture during the two scenes I've described, and there is at least a little push-back from the assembled reporters ("Legality can be inconvenient").  But the key point is, again, that the question of torture is recognized and discussed, and the viewer, who has been exposed to the atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict, is, for the moment, left to consider whether the tactic can truly be justified.

2) Secondly, The Battle of Algiers does not shy away from depicting the brutality of torture.  Indeed, the scene that follows the press conference scene shown above demonstrates just what grim "necessary consequences" Mathieu is referencing.  It is in this scene - one of the most harrowing in classic cinema (beginning at 1:35:18 in the full-length YouTube video) - that we see the full brutality of Mathieu's techniques.  And this is not "mere" waterboarding - although two forms of water-torture (forced ingestion of water and repeatedly holding a prisoner's head underwater) are depicted.  No, this goes far beyond that: this is torture with blowtorches; torture by hanging bloodied and beaten hog-tied men from the ceiling; and torture by electrocution.

No artistic depiction of torture can be considered honest if it does not convey the horror and brutality involved in such tactics.  In this sense, both The Battle of Algiers and, as we will see, ZD30 succeed.

3) Most significantly, however, The Battle of Algiers shows the ultimate futility - and, indeed, the counter-productivity - of the French military's use of torture.  The French may have won the Battle of Algiers by killing or imprisoning the entire leadership of the FLN, but a battle is not the war, and France's brutal actions in Algiers resulted in a significant increase in the popularity of anti-colonial and anti-French ideology among the native Algerian population.  Left to metastasize for several (relatively) peaceful years, this anti-colonial sentiment burst back into the open in December 1960, with mass demonstrations in support of an independent Algeria.  This is depicted in the film's final 10 minutes, with the film's finale showing a scene from the last day of the 1960 demonstrations while the narrator states that two years later Algeria achieved its independence.

In other words, torture isn't something that occurs in a vacuum.  While it may - and let's really stress that "may" - be useful for achieving certain goals, its consequences and side effects should not be ignored.  Indeed, as The Battle of Algiers shows, the consequences of torture are far more significant than their limited successes: while it is unclear whether France would have been able to maintain control over Algeria without using torture and other brutal tactics to cripple the FLN, its very use of torture and brutality played a central role in turning the native Algerian population against the French and making France's eventual ejection from northern Africa all but certain.  This is one of the key points of the film, and it is a point that other filmmakers, to say nothing of other governments, ought to take note of.

As we will see in the next post (which will likely take several days or so to write . . . sorry), this point is one that was decidedly lost on Kathryn Bigelow when making Zero Dark Thirty.  Rather than depict the large-scale consequences of torture - a precipitous decline in the United States' popularity in the Arab/Muslim World, a loss of stature among even the US's staunchest allies, and justification for greater radicalization and more terrorist attacks - Bigelow chooses, instead, to depict . . . well . . . NO negative consequences of torture.  Not even such comparatively mundane problems as faulty intelligence are treated in Zero Dark Thirty.

But this is the topic of the next post in this series, and I would hate to rant too much about it now.  Until then, I hope you enjoy the early part of your week and I really do recommend that you take some time, if you have it, to watch The Battle of Algiers.  It is truly an excellent film.

Today's Interesting Links

Here are some interesting links from today:

Syria:

• I found this to be particularly interesting: al-Arabiya has made an online "deck of cards" depicting the who's who of the Assad Regime modeled after the infamous Iraqi deck used by the USA during the early part of the Iraq War.

Saudi Arabia:

• "Saudi Royal Family Politics and the Arab Spring" (Foreign Policy)

Mali and the French Military Offensive:
Lots of links regarding France's military offensive in Mali . . . 

• "Making Sense of Mali's Armed Groups" (Al Jazeera)
• "Mali Islamists Counter-Attack, Promise France Long War" (Reuters) 
• "Mali Islamists Much Stronger Than Expected: France" (Lebanon Daily Star)
• "Islamist Insurgents Gain Ground in Mali" (Washington Post)
• "France in Mali: The End of the Fairytale" (Africa is a Country (Blog))
• Additionally, for those looking for an overview of what has been going on in Mali and the French offensive so far, this episode of Al Jazeera English's "Inside Story" does a fairly good job of explaining things (with commentary, as well):

• And here is another brief news clip from EuroNews:

Yemen:

• "Yemen Raid Nets Two Al Qaeda Militants: Security Sources" (NYT)

Counter-Terrorism/Strategy:

• Joshua Foust makes the case that "War on Terror Should Focus on Captures, Not Killings" (Bloomberg)

The War on Terror in Yemen: A Review of Gregory Johnsen's "The Last Refuge"

Several days ago, I finished reading a book that I had been looking forward to reading for some time: The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Yemen, by Gregory Johnsen.  Published last fall (November 2012), The Last Refuge had to be laid aside while I finished my law semester and studied for finals.  But the Christmas holiday gave me the time I needed and, now, here we are.  Because of the importance of the topics addressed in Mr. Johnsen's book and the fact that Yemen is an often-forgotten front in the United State's continuing campaign against al-Qaeda, I've decided to write a brief review of the book.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

It is likely that, if most Americans were asked to name the central fronts in the continuing battle against al-Qaeda, to the extent they would answer at all, they would cite Afghanistan or Pakistan.  Perhaps those who were up on recent news would name Mali.  But, after the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in a US drone strike in late September 2011 and the subsequent fading of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from the headlines, comparatively few would name Yemen, the oft-forgotten country occupying the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. 

At least one person, however, has not forgotten either Yemen or America's recent foreign policy forays in the country, nor underestimated the continuing significance of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  This person, Gregory Johnsen - Yemen expert, former Fulbright Fellow (in Yemen), and PhD candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University - has written a splendid book on the topic: The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia.  I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that Mr. Johnsen has written what is currently the preeminent book on al-Qaeda's expansion to Yemen; its early operations there; and its exploitation of the country's porous borders, tribal networks, and lack of strong central governance to expand its numbers and its strength.

Johnsen's story begins, like so many books about al-Qaeda, during the heyday of the Afghan-Soviet War, the 9-year conflict that proved to be the birthplace of the modern radical Islamist/jihadist movement.  Following the cast of characters that has become so familiar to counter-terrorism researchers - Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and, of course, Osama bin Laden, as well as lesser-known (but no less significant) figures like Yemeni cleric Abd al-Majid al-Zindani - Johnsen weaves a fine narrative of the importance of the Afghan War to the Arab World, and, specifically, the Yemen, of the 1980s.  Additionally, he provides a primer on the development of Osama bin Laden's violent ideology, an offshoot (and significant expansion) of his mentor Azzam's theory that violent jihad in defense of Muslim territory was fard al-ayn (الفرض العين) - an individual duty incumbent on all Muslims.

Equally important to the tale of al-Qaeda in Yemen is bin Laden's post-Afghanistan development of his terrorist organization and the progressive expansion of his ideology from merely battling "non-Islamic" intruders in the Arab world, to attacking the "apostate" governments aligned with the United States; from attacking U.S. interests in the region, to attacking American civilians (regardless of their gender, age, or military/civilian status) in the heart of the United States.  Bin Laden had little interest in the United States until the first Gulf War, when, with the acquiescence of the al-Saud monarchy, American troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of the American-led military campaign to expel Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait.  Indeed, as Johnsen describes, bin Laden's first post-Afghanistan plot involved jihad against the communist government of what was then South Yemen, directly to the south of bin Laden's home country of Saudi Arabia:

"In the months after Azzam's assassination [e.g. late 1989/early 1990], bin Laden and Fadhli [e.g. Tariq al-Fadhli, a veteran of bin Laden's cadre of "Arab Afghans"] sat up late in the evening . . . as they sketched out the future of jihad in bin Laden's apartment. They were both drawn to Yemen, the land of their father . . . . Said to be the Arab world's Afghanistan, Yemen was full of tribes and mountains, and, at least in the south, was ruled by Socialists. But mostly it was a blank map onto which the two young jihadis could project their ambitions." (Pgs. 17-18)

While America's so-called "occupation" of the "Land of the Two Holy Places" quickly turned bin Laden's attention away from Yemen back to Saudi Arabia and beyond the sea to the United States, the seeds of the al-Qaeda organization he had planted in Yemen, with Tariq al-Fadhli as his regional lieutenant, would continue to grow.

And it is precisely here that we find the crux of Johnsen's story: the growth, decimation, and resurrection of al-Qaeda in Yemen.  With a few exceptions (events like the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and names like Anwar al-Awlaki), this story is an unfamiliar one.  But it is a fascinating and incredibly informative tale - a tale that should be required reading for anyone interested in al-Qaeda, the War on Terror, or counter-terrorism studies generally.  Johnsen details how Yemen's internal politics allowed al-Qaeda to grow and thrive during the early 1990s, as Ali Abdullah Saleh (the President of North Yemen who had recently overseen Yemen's unification with his Southern counterpart, Ali Salim al-Bid) twice allied with Tariq al-Fadhli, bin Laden's lieutenant, in order to strengthen his own power in relation to his rivals in southern Yemen.  As Johnsen writes,

"Fadhli was loyal to bin Laden and the plan they had made together, but he was also bound to his father's tribe and their lands in the south. . . . . But for the moment, at least, Fadhli didn't have to choose. In the early 1990s, Salih and the jihadists were on the same side." (Pg. 22)

But, for Yemen's al-Qaeda branch, all good things had to come to an end.  While facing some internal difficulties during the mid and late '90s, with the turn of the century and the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole in October 2000 and the Twin Towers and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda in Yemen's grace period was over: the group was then firmly in the crosshairs of the United States.  Johnsen's depiction of the diplomatic back-and-forth between the US and Salih in the aftermath of 9/11, and the two allies' eventual destruction of al-Qaeda's Yemeni-based operations structure is a fascinating, and the final reversal of America and Yemen's initial success - the rebirth of al-Qaeda in Yemen as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula under the leadership of Islamists like Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Said Ali al-Shihri, and Anwar Awlaki - chilling in its implications.

Perhaps just as interesting as Johnsen's overarching history of al-Qaeda in Yemen is a comparatively brief interlude in the book's fourth chapter, "Faith and Wisdom," describing the tribulations of Ayman al-Zawahiri's terrorist organization, al-Jihad (aka Egyptian Islamic Jihad), during the mid-1990s and the open revolt of many of the organization's members in the wake of Zawahiri's decision to align al-Jihad with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda in 1998.  As Johnsen writes,

"Along with several other terrorist leaders, Zawahiri and bin Laden issued a fatwa entitled 'Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.' The declaration of war urged 'every Muslim' to kill Americans and Jews wherever they found them. Zawahiri's followers in Yemen were stunned. They hadn't been consulted. What was their boss doing? Criticism poured in from around the Middle East, Africa, and Europe as members of al-Jihad struggled to come to terms with Zawahiri's about-face. They were supposed to be fighting Mubarak's regime, and now Zawahiri wanted them to kill Americans.

. . . Convinced their leader had lost touch, al-Jihad operatives around the world started announcing their resignation." (Pg. 52-53)

I found this particularly interesting simply because I was unaware that the alliance between bin Laden and Zawahiri resulted in such discord within the jihadi community.

Anyway, to wrap it up, I would highly recommend The Last Refuge to anyone interested in counter-terrorism or security studies, Yemen, al-Qaeda, or the Middle East in general.  It is an excellent read, and well worth your time and money.

Vive le France: French Intervention in Mali

Today's big story is the French decision to militarily intervene in the Mali conflict (aka the "Tuareg Rebellion"), which, over the course of the past year, has left northern Mali ("Azawad") in the hands of several militant Islamist groups linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.  Throughout the summer, fall, and winter of 2012, these Islamist groups, Ansar Dine and Jamaat at-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad (the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), have consolidated their control over Azawad - turning on their erstwhile secular allies in the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA); imposing a strict, puritanical version of shari'a law; and engaging in tragic acts of cultural vandalism.  The Islamist rebels have also been pushing south, and, earlier this week, seized several towns in the central area of the fractured Malian state.  They are now threatening the military garrison town of Mopti, and several US aid groups in the area have been ordered to evacuate.  Here, courtesy of le Wikipedia, is a map depicting rebel gains as of yesterday, January 10:

Source: Wikipedia, "Northern Mali Conflict (2012 - Present)"

Now, into this maelstrom steps a man: a man who is willing to meet force with force and to stand firm in the face of terrorism.  Did George W. Bush hear the word "t'rrist", throw on his cowboy boots, and leap back onto his war horse?  No sir.  Allow me to introduce to you the new maestro of foreign intervention: Monsieur François Hollande, the socialist president of France.  Earlier today, Mr. Hollande gave a statement at the Élysée Palace in Paris, announcing France's decision to respond to the Malian government's request for military aid and stating that "French Armed Forces have, this afternoon, lent their support to Malian units to fight against these terrorist elements.  This operation will last for as long as necessary." Here is Mr. Hollande's full speech/statement: 

In the immediate wake of the French deployment, it has been reported that the Malian Army, backed by French forces, was able to retake the city of Konna from the Islamists.  

This story is, obviously, still developing.  I hope to write and comment on it further in the coming days, but, for now, here are a number of other stories about the French military intervention that you can look at:

• "France Sends Troops to Mali to Help Counter Islamist Threat" (NYT)
• "Mali and the Return of Françafrique" (FP "Passport" Blog, Joshua Keating)
• "French Troops Target Terrorists in Mali as Newest Shadow War Begins" (Danger Room)
• "French Military Deploys to Mali: What's Next?" (UN Dispatch)

Al Jazeera Video Report on Syria's Jabhat al-Nusra

This video is from a few days ago, but still interesting . . .

Bonus Video: additionally, I also found this video, which includes the Arabic-language (with English subtitles) of the Al-Jazeera video above, as well as a CNN report on Jabhat al-Nusra. Note that the final third of this video comes from Syria's al-Ikhbariya news channel and is *pure Syrian regime propaganda* - it contains such ridiculous gems as "[The US] is promoting the [al-Nusra] terror organization and producing a new justification for the US administration to continue its invasion of the countries of the world, under the pretense of the so-called 'War on Terror.' "  If I could have found another copy of the CNN report somewhere else, I would have posted that; but I couldn't, so . . .   

What is the al-Nusra Front? (Part 3 - Why is the al-Nusra Front Important?)

Returning, once again, to our discussion of the al-Nusra Front, I'd like to (hopefully) conclude with a post about why the al-Nusra Front is important in the grand scheme of the Syrian conflict.

Why is the al-Nusra Front So Powerful/Important?

The al-Nusra Front is powerful and important for several reasons.  First, to put things very bluntly, al-Nusra is powerful because it's good at what it does.  While it is a fairly new group (having only been formed in January of this year), it is, as has been elaborated in one of my earlier posts, responsible for some of the most significant attacks against the Assad regime and the Syrian Army that have occurred since the beginning of the Syrian uprising.  In total, the group has claimed credit for over six hundred (600) attacks over the past year.

In addition to the group's sheer ferocity and the frequency/scale of its attacks, the al-Nusra Front is also significant due to its jihadist connections and its association with al-Qaeda.  The group has been described as the "next big al-Qaida franchise," and it is thought to be an offshoot of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) - the umbrella organization of Iraqi terror/insurgent groups that includes al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).  Indeed, al-Nusra's connections to AQI proved to be one of the main justifications provided by the US State Department when it blacklisted the al-Nusra Front as a "foreign terrorist organization" in early December 2012.  The State Department press release stated that while "al-Nusrah has sought to portray itself as part of the legitimate Syrian opposition," its attacks are, instead, "an attempt by AQI to hijack the struggles of the Syrian people for its own malign purposes."

Al-Nusra's connection to AQI and the ISI provides the group with a distinct advantage over other Syrian factions in terms of expertise, experience, and foreign resources.  Additionally, as Aaron Zelin has written in Foreign Policy, the al-Nusra Front benefits from its al-Qaeda connections through its access to online jihadi media forums:

"Jabhat al-Nusra is also plugged into al Qaeda's transnational online media echo system. Its official media outlet, al-Manara al-Bayda ("the White Minaret"), maintains ties with al Qaeda's web forums Shamukh al-Islam and al-Fida' al-Islam. On Shamukh, there is even a dedicated section for Jabhat al-Nusra's releases -- a status only shared with the ISI."

This access provides al-Nusra with a ready audience of jihadi/Islamist sympathizers to whom it publishes its statements and videos, some of which are fairly well-edited and heavily produced.  It also provides a platform for glossy "terrorist-training-camp-fun-time!" photos like these:

Finally, in addition to the frequency/ferocity of its attacks, its connections to al-Qaeda, and its . . . slick(?) . . . online advertising, the al-Nusra Front is important because it seems to be employing a strategy that other Islamist groups have used to significant affect in other areas of the Arab world.  This strategy is to use the provision of social services to bolster the group's prestige and to ingratiate it to the local community in the areas under its control.

Like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas before it, the al-Nusra Front has already begun to employ this tactic, taking over important agricultural and energy operations in Deir Ezzor (Dayr al-Zawr) and the nearby city of Abu Kamal.  As Hassan Hassan writes (again in Foreign Policy), the al-Nusra Front is "perceived to be more disciplined and concerned with local communities' needs" than its secular counter-parts in the Syrian opposition, and the group has taken it upon itself to provide security for local businesses, affordable fuel distribution, and a host of other relief services.  Many Syrians, Hassan writes, "are drawn to the group by virtue of its effectiveness in fighting the regime and delivering public services."  The more firmly entrenched the al-Nusra Front becomes in the areas under its control, and the more public goodwill the group can accrue through its dispensation of social services, the more difficult it will be for more moderate, secular factions of the Syrian opposition to uproot it after the Syrian conflict has concluded.

What is the al-Nusra Front? (Part 2 - What Has the Group Done?)

Continuing our discussion of the al-Nusra Front, we'll now turn from a more general discussion of the group and its mysterious leadership to its actions and its growing strength within the cadre of Syrian rebel groups fighting against the Assad regime.

What Has the al-Nusra Front Done?
Early in the year, during the first weeks/months of the al-Nusra Front's existence, it is somewhat difficult to determine precisely what attacks the group was responsible for.  Indeed, because some of the early attacks that were later claimed by, or attributed to, the al-Nusra Front - for instance, a suicide bombing of a trio of buses carrying Syrian riot police in a Damascus neighborhood in early January - occurred before the group was well known, rumors were rampant that al-Nusra was, in fact, a front created by the Syrian government to discredit the Free Syrian Army and other rebel factions.

Regardless of the truth or falsity of al-Nusra's claims on early attacks, the rest of 2012 demonstrated the group's grim expertise, its power, and it authenticity.

For a more complete list of (claimed) attacks by the al-Nusra Front than you will ever likely need, I'd recommend consulting the group's Arabic-language statements, which have been gathered on the Jihadology blog by the inimitable Aaron Zelin.  However, the following is but a brief list of al-Nusra's most significant attacks:

• May 29, 2012: al-Nusra claimed responsibility for the mass-execution of 13 people in Deir Ezzor.  (NOTE: al-Nusra was also allegedly responsible for further such massacres in Deir Ezzor later in the year, such as this video from early December that supposedly shows al-Nusra fighters executing bound captives).
• October 3, 2012: al-Nusra claimed responsibility for a triple suicide car-bombing in Aleppo's Sa'adallah al-Jabiri Square.  The group claimed to be targeting Syrian command centers at a nearby officer's club, two hotels, and the local municipal offices.
• Early October 2012: al-Nusra allegedly partnered with the Free Syrian Army to seize control of an airbase in al-Ta'aneh outside of Aleppo.  This joint operation supposedly allowed the group to obtain a number of anti-aircraft missiles.
• Early December 2012: al-Nusra and several associated Islamist groups seized control of the Sheik Suleiman military base outside of Aleppo.  Allegedly, this base houses a scientific research facility connected to Syria's chemical weapons program.

Additionally, here is a map depicting the locations and relative frequency of al-Nusra's attacks between January and September 2012:

Source: Elizabeth O'Bagy, "Jihad in Syria," Middle East Security Report 6, September 2012.

Finally, the al-Nusra Front's terrorist output is prolific.  The group has claimed credit for hundreds of attacks, large and small - ranging from small-arms battles and attacks on traffic checkpoints to major suicide or car/truck bombings - including, in one instance, claiming credit for forty-five (45) attacks in four separate Syrian provinces in a single day.  In total, al-Nusra is allegedly responsible for nearly 600 attacks against Syrian forces and Assad loyalists since November 2011 (Time Magazine and State Department Press Statement Designating al-Nusra as a Terrorist Organization).

And . . . I was going to make this post a bit longer and discuss the importance of the al-Nusra Front within the larger context of the Syrian conflict/civil-war, but . . . I think this is long enough for now.

Today's Interesting Links

Here are some interesting links from my perusal of the interwebs today:

• Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia) releases photographs of FBI agents involved in the investigation of the 9/11 Benghazi consulate attack.  (Long War Journal)
• Blackwater Wins the Battle of Benghazi (Wired's Danger Room)
• A new CRS report on chemical weapons (CRS)
• Counter-terrorism developments in North Africa ("Counterterrorism Across North Africa: Complicated, Messy but Moving Forward" - Selected Wisdom)
• The final vote-count for yesterday's referendum on Egypt's draft constitution - by Iyad El-Baghdadi (@iyad_elbaghdadi) and Galal ??? (@GalalAmrG).

Also, some Syria stories:

• Russia won't offer the Assad family asylum (San Francisco Chronicle)
• Warplanes Bomb Bakery, Kill Scores (CNN)
• And the NYT runs a story on the possibility of the establishment of an Allawite stronghold along the coast of western Syria (NYT)

UPDATE: al-Jazeera is running a story/video alleging that the Assad regime is using nerve gas against Syrian rebels in the city of Homs.  Here is the alleged video.  It should go without saying that the contents of the video cannot be independently verified.  Additionally, a lot of the commenters are knocking the video as a fake, noting that the doctors don't seem to be wearing any protective gear or taking any significant precautions.  This sounds like a relatively decent point, but I'm no expert on chemical weapons.  It seems to me that biological weapons would certainly require the doctors to take greater precautions when treating afflicted victims; however, chemical weapons seems like a horse of a different color, as it were.  So, in short, I don't know.  If I find out anything further about the video, I'll post another update.

What is the al-Nusra Front? (Part 1)

As the Syrian conflict/civil-war continues to spiral into a bloodier and bloodier mess, I want to take a moment to write about a group that is playing a central role in the conflict: Jabhat al-Nusra (جبهة النصرة لأهل الشام), aka the al-Nusra Front. The al-Nusra Front was big news about a week ago when the US government designated the group as a terrorist organization.

So what is the al-Nusra Front?  Who are its members?  And what is the role that the group has played, is playing, and may eventually play in the larger Syrian conflict of which it is but one small (albeit powerful) component part?

As a general introduction, the al-Nusra Front is one of the most - if not the most - powerful factions involved in the Syrian conflict.  It was founded in January 2012.  The group's religious bent is Sunni Islamic, and its ideology is, more specifically, Salafist: as one military commander of the group has stated,

"Our first goal is to get rid of Assad. Then we want a state where the Quran is the only source of law . . . . Sharia is the right path for all humanity - all other laws make people unhappy."

Indeed, as the International Crisis group has pointed out, the al-Nusra Front views the deposition of Bashar al-Assad and his regime as "only half the battle."  Full success for al-Nusra will "come only once the entire regime was replaced with an Islamic state following Salafi principles."  (See International Crisis Group, "Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition").

Leader(s): The leaders of the al-Nusra Front are largely unknown.  An unidentified man using the nom de guerre of Al-Fateh Abu Muhammad al-Jolani (transliteration differences online sometimes render this as "al-Golani," "al-Jilani," or "al-Jawlani") narrated the group's initial video release (main portion of video w/ subtitles beginning around 4:02), announcing its formation, describing the rationale for its coming to Syria, and outlining its aims. Al-Jolani has been identified as the al-Nusra Front's leader, or, in some instances, as its "General Secretary."  Whatever that means.  I don't have a picture of this mysterious al-Jolani to show you. Sorry.  Or maybe I do . . . here's a picture of general khafiya-clad al-Nusra Front members from their video.  Maybe he's one of them - like, say, black-hooded-executioner-guy in the bottom corner?

The number and identities of other senior al-Nusra Front officers are equally unknown.  Allegedly, however, much of the top leadership is made up of non-Syrians: specifically, Lebanese and Palestinian militants - some of whom are linked to the Palestinian Fatah al-Islam organization.  This analysis of al-Nusra's leadership seems to have found some level of confirmation from the testimony of Syrian fighters who have fought or interacted with the al-Nusra Front in various ways.  For instance:

A rebel soldier who briefly joined JN [e.g. Jabhat al-Nusra] before opting to join with the rebel Suqour al-Sham Brigade stated that, "Most of the young men I worked with were Syrian revolutionaries who joined JN because they were stronger and more effective. Yes we are mujahideen, but we didn’t think of it as al-Qaeda."  He added, "There was a lot of secrecy surrounding the leadership.  I left JN when I discovered that many of the leaders were not Syrian but Lebanese or Palestinians that used to work with the Syrian intelligence agencies."

 The general consensus is that the ranks of the al-Nusra Front's leadership are filled with a number of experienced jihadists who have fought on various battlefields throughout the Arab World and Central Asia.

I am going to cut this off here for length purposes, but will post more on al-Nusra within the next several days.