Monday, April 15, 2013

Terror in Boston

As anyone with a newsfeed or a television probably knows by now, two bombs exploded earlier today near the finish line of the Boston Marathon - and at least three more (the Wall Street Journal is reporting *five* more) unexploded bombs were discovered by police along the marathon route.  The perpetrators of the attack are currently unknown, and the void has been filled by the ideologically-driven speculation of Tweeps and pundits: the usual host of anti-Islam bloggers (Pamela Geller, Robert Spencer) has already labeled the attack "Jihad in Boston," while the more left-wing hosts of several major cable news program (Wolf Blitzer, Chris Matthews), as well as "progressive" filmmaker Michael Moore, have speculated that the attacks may be the work of domestic, right-wing terrorists protesting tax day.  In other words, plenty of people have (somewhat ghoulishly) taken the opportunity to begin beating their own favorite whipping boy(s).

Regardless of who perpetrated this atrocity, what occurred in Boston today was horrific. In the words of one witness:
“These runners just finished and they don’t have legs now. . . . So many of them. There are so many people without legs. It’s all blood. There’s blood everywhere. You got bones, fragments. It’s disgusting. It’s like a war zone.”
While CNN is reporting that an initial examination of the bombs reveals them to be fairly crude, the two explosives that were successfully detonated were apparently packed with ball-bearings - a common method of increasing the amount of shrapnel "spray" produced by an explosion, and, thus, a way to maximize injuries/casualties. While there is, as yet, no final word on the number of casualties from the Boston attack, the current casualty count is 2 dead and 132 injured, with 10 people requiring limb amputations.

Further complicating the story today were reports of either a fire or explosion of some kind at the John F. Kennedy Library in Dorchester, MA. While this initially appeared to be connected to the bombings at the Marathon, local police seemed to have walked this back.... It is currently unclear what caused the fire/damage to the library or whether it was in some way connected to the terrorist bombings.

I'm sure that more information will continue to become available . . .

Here is a video of attack released by the Boston Globe. WARNING: it is horrific. You can hear the second explosion occur at approximately 0.19 seconds in.


Monday, April 8, 2013

Margaret Thatcher (1925-2013)

Blogging has been light recently, and I'm sorry for that. As finals approach, law school is sucking more and more of my soul out of me....

But I couldn't let the death of the great Margaret Thatcher go unnoticed here. I don't have much time, so I will leave the full-fledged eulogies and the hard-nosed analyses of Thatcherite policies for others. But I wanted to throw up some videos of the "Iron Lady" so that we might all remember the kind of politicians the world used to have:

1) Thatcher's First Speech at the White House: "I hope you don't mind my recalling, Mr. President, that George Washington was a British subject until well after his 40th birthday!"


2) First Televised "Prime Ministers Questions":



3) A Snippet of the Infamous "Iron Lady" Speech:


4) Thatcher's Last Speech in the House of Commons:


5) And Some General "Best Ofs" . . .



Requiescat in pace, Maggie.

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Ten Years On: Ten Books on the Iraq War You Should Read

As the tenth anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq arrives, it seems like every newspaper, foreign policy journal, blog, and commentator is running their obligatory "looking back" feature.  And, well, I'm nothing if not a follower (baaaaa), so onto the bandwagon we go!

The Iraq War was a formative conflict for the younger version of your dear author.  I was only a sophomore in high school when the war began, and, looking back, I have to admit that I really didn't understand a thing that was going on.  Like most of the media and most of the American public, I initially bought into the "weapons of mass destruction" rationale for the war.  For some reason, however, younger me foolishly felt that this only further negated the case for war with Saddam Hussein.  I still remember a comment I made to a high school acquaintance during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion.  In what must have sounded like my best impression of a low-to-mid-level UN bureaucrat, I said something like, "This invasion business is so stupid.  It will only make Saddam more likely to use his weapons!  I am so wise in my high school wisdom.  So wise."  Dammit, younger me.  Dammit.

While I might not have been the sharpest foreign policy analyst at age 15 (I'm still not, actually, but that's beside the point...), the Iraq War triggered my interest in the Middle East, in foreign affairs, and in US national security policy, and also influenced my decision to study government, foreign policy, and conflict management in college and graduate school.  The war also influenced my reading habits for the better part of a decade, as I more and more frequently replaced the novels I typically read in elementary, middle, and early high school with non-fiction accounts of Middle Eastern history, politics, and religion.  And so, in dubious honor of the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, I present, without much further ado, my list of 10 books about the Iraq War that you should read:


1) The Fall of Baghdad (John Lee Anderson)

Jon Lee Anderson's The Fall of Baghdad was one of the first books about the Iraq War that I read, shortly after it was released in the summer or fall of 2005 - if my memory serves me correctly.  For this reason alone, I think, it will always hold one of the top spots in any Iraq-related book list I might create.  Anderson's story of an Iraq in turmoil and a Baghdad besieged by American airpower and military might, which begins during his time reporting from Iraq in the months preceding the March 2003 invasion, is riveting.  It could also be quite tense, as Anderson's description of a progressing invasion and the increasing levels of danger for himself and the people (both Iraqis and foreign journalists) around him are clearly conveyed to the reader.




2) Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor)

Billed as the "definitive" account of the United States' invasion and early occupation of Iraq, Cobra II really delivers.  This book tells the story of the Iraq invasion in rich detail; indeed, at the time of its release, the NY Times stated that the book was "likely become the benchmark by which other histories of the Iraq invasion are measured."  It also has some very nice maps depicting initial troop movements into Iraq, military movements, etc.  Although it doesn't cover the bulk of the war (I think that it really only discusses the first six to eight months, ending sometime in late 2003, if I remember correctly), the book is invaluable for its very apt descriptions of the mistakes and foolish decisions that would sow the seeds of the Iraqi insurgency.



3) Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War (Anthony Shadid)

This fascinating book, written by Anthony Shadid - the Pulitzer-prize-winning NY Times foreign correspondent who tragically died of an asthma attack in Syria early last year - gets away from the American-oriented view of most of the other books on this list and tells the story of the Iraq War from the perspective of ordinary Iraqis.  Caught in the cross-fire between the US military and the Iraqi Army, and then, even more dangerously, between the shadowy and indiscriminate insurgency and its foreign (and domestic) enemies, these were the people who suffered and whose lives were affect the most.

NOTE: it is also interesting to compare Shadid's opening, a description of the events surrounding Saddam Hussein's proclamation of a general amnesty in the aftermath of the October 2002 sham "elections," with Fall of Baghdad, which opens with Anderson's description of the same events.


4) My War: Killing Time in Iraq (Colby Buzzell)

There were a number of books I could have chosen from the American-soldier-in-Iraq perspective, including The Last True Story I'll Ever Tell (John Crawford) or The Long Walk (Brian Castner), all of which are good reads.  But one of the first I read was Colby Buzzell's My War, which stayed with me for some time after I read it, and which I steadfastly refuse to get rid of during my periodic book-purges.  Buzzell's descriptions of his time as a machine-gunner in Iraq, as well as his personal reflections on joining the military, getting married (at a drive-thru wedding chapel in Vegas, with Slayer's "Angel of Death" playing on the CD changer), and keeping an anonymous blog during his deployment, make for a fascinating story of the Iraq War through the eyes of an infantryman.


5) Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003-2005 (Thomas Ricks)

As the title of Ricks' book makes clear, Fiasco doesn't pull any punches.  Similar to Cobra II (above) and The Assassin's Gate (below), Fiasco is a highly detailed account of the run-up to war, the invasion of Iraq, the growth of the insurgency, and the sectarian violence that gripped the country in 2004 and 2005.  Among the most significant and interesting components to the book is Ricks' harsh criticism of Donald Rumsfeld's invasion plans and the paucity of the invasion force, factors that contributed to early security lapses (such as widespread looting) and, much more significantly, the later "negligent" occupation of the country.





6) The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (Fred Kaplan)

The Insurgents, the most recently-released book included on this list, is less about the Iraq War per se as it is about General Petraeus and his efforts to change the military's thinking about modern warfare - specifically, using the maelstrom of Iraq to shift American war-making to a counterinsurgency (COIN) model.  Kaplan is able to tell this story in a detailed and interesting way through information gleaned from interviews with such significant figures as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, General Peter Chiarelli, General Raymond Odierno, and, of course, General Petraeus himself.





7) Voices from Iraq: A People's History, 2003-2009 (Mark Kukis)

Another book getting back to the perspective of Iraqis, Voices from Iraq offers over 70 Iraqis an opportunity to tell their own stories, in their own voices.  Kukis devotes each chapter to the stories of several Iraqis, from a wide variety of backgrounds and ethnic groups, and writes their narratives in the first person perspective.  In this way, the Iraqis Kukis interviewed serve as advocates for their countrymen and women, giving a highly personalized account of the trials they have faced, the violence they have endured, and the successes they have achieved since the American invasion.  I find this book to be fascinating, and, in a way, even better than Night Draws Near, because it portrays the humanity of its speakers in a way that more novelesque non-fiction books simply cannot. 

8) The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (Thomas Ricks)/The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor)

OK, I cheated and packed two books into one heading.  Well, someone was going to get on here twice, and it was either going to be Tom Ricks or the Gordon/Trainor team.  The books are fairly similar in terms of subject matter, so I figured why not both?  These volumes detail the later years of the Iraq War, specifically, the "Surge" strategy that would eventually succeed in weakening the insurgency and establishing at least a modicum of security in the fragile country.

And . . . Tom Ricks gets the picture ==>



9) The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq (George Packer)

George Packer's The Assassin's Gate is, at least in my mind, one of the original great Iraq War books.  Published before some of the other big-name books detailing the early years of the Iraq War (e.g. Cobra II and Fiasco, see above), The Assassin's Gate detailed the rise of neo-conservatism (the ideological driver of the Iraq War), the run-up to war in Iraq, the swift success of the invasion, the early mistakes of America's politicians, and the beginning of an ever-more-dangerous insurgency in the "liberated" country.









10) The Surge: A Military History (Kimberly Kagan)

The Surge, which would be interesting to read in conjunction with The Insurgents (above), is another book that focuses on the period between 2006 and the end of 2007 - the heyday of the US military's (and Kagan's titular) "surge."  Kagan focuses on the operational history of the surge, describing the use of surge troops to help pacify Baghdad and various Iraqi provinces, discussing the Sunni "Awakening" movement, and even detailing the responses to the surge by America's enemies (such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, Iranian-backed Shi'a groups, and others).


Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Anti-Semitism in the Netherlands, and the Consequences of Confronting It

I'm a bit late posting this, but when I first watched this video last week, I was very disturbed.  Now, however, new developments to this story have made me even more upset.  First, the video:


In the video above, Mehmet Sahin, a PhD candidate at Universiteit Leiden's Netherlands Interuniversity School for Islamic Studies, interviews several Dutch students of Turkish descent about their attitudes towards Jews and Judaism.  The results are horrific.  The viewer can get the sense of the video immediately, as the first student leads with the comment: "What Hitler did to the Jews . . . to be honest, I'm happy about it!"  The other students agree, echoing the first student's opinion that the Jews killed in the Holocaust deserved to die.  In response to Sahin's questions regarding the source of the students' anti-semitic views, they admit that they have mostly formed their opinions of Jews from talking to their friends.  But not just their Muslim friends . . . as one student chillingly insists, "I have many Dutch friends who can't stand the Jews.  The whole of our school doesn't like the Jews! Just come to our school and you'll see!"  Indeed, to these Dutch schoolchildren the word "Jew" is a curse-word and insult, perhaps the equivalent of modern American middle- and high school students' "douchebag."

As if this video was not terrible enough, however, the consequences that releasing it appears to have had for Mr. Sahin are even worse.  According to a story published in the Netherland's NRC Handelsblad daily evening newspaper on March 9, Mr. Sahin received death threats - reportedly from the local Islamic community - in the days after the clip above was shown on Dutch television.  The NRC writes that Sahin and his family were forced to go into hiding for at least several days, and that the local community has started a petition to "get him away" from the neighborhood.  (NOTE: I don't totally know what that means . . . whether it is in the sense of exiling Sahin and his family from the neighborhood, or something more simple like forbidding him to conduct his academic research there? I don't know whether Sahim lives in this neighborhood or not...).  And all this because he had the audacity to report on the vile opinions that Dutch youth, and perhaps particularly Dutch Muslim youth, are forming about Jews.

As Dutch Parliamentarian Ahmed Marcouch is quoted as saying in the NRC article, "It is appalling that anyone should be afraid because he has done something which we all should do: teach children not to hate."

I am personally appalled at this story, and I hope that Mr. Sahin will be able to return from hiding soon and continue his research.  Racism and anti-semitism cannot be addressed if it is pushed under the rug and allowed to fester, whether out of ignorance or fear of confrontation.  With luck, the Dutch authorities will investigate this incident further and come up with some meaningful ways to combat anti-semitism and foster tolerance in Dutch society.

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

Sorry-for-Being-Busy Post/Rwandan Genocide Television Program

Greetings, readers!  I'm sorry that it's been a while since I've posted anything . . . .  Law school has been grinding me down of late, and bar applications, a new research assistant job, and other assorted happenings have hindered my ability to post consistently. :(

Anyway, I hope to get back to fairly regular posting soon, but I wanted to throw up a semi-"filler" post so that at least something new was posted.

So, here, as a bit of atypical filler, I wanted to share this PBS Frontline documentary about the Rwanda Genocide.  I recently had to watch a different, shorter PBS documentary on this topic ("The Triumph of Evil") for one of my graduate classes.  This one is longer, with more interviews - including extensive interviews with Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, the Force Commander for the UNAMIR peacekeeping mission that was supposed to be enforcing the Rwandan ceasefire.  This documentary is heartbreaking, and it is a grim reminder (as if more recent atrocities weren't a reminder enough) that the governments of the world are much more likely to feign ignorance or excuse while genocide occurs, and then weep crocodile tears in its aftermath, than they are to live up to the post-Holocaust pledge of "never again."















Sunday, February 17, 2013

Prisoner X, Lies, and Videotape

The world has been captivated this past week by the strange saga of Ben Zygier, Israel's so-called "Prisoner X" - an apparently high-value prisoner held at Israel's Ayalon prison under a false name until he allegedly hanged himself in December 2010.  I have been following the story with some perplexity; I was in Israel during the summer of 2010, when the existence of "Prisoner X" was inadvertently revealed via a passing reference in an online YNet article, but I honestly have no recollection of the media storm that the revelation created.  It has only been this weekend, when I've finally had time to sit and read up on it that I feel I've been able to grasp what's been going on . . .

The basic story is as follows: the existence of a mysterious, unnamed prisoner being held in the high-security Ayalon prison was originally revealed in a YNet article published in the summer of 2010.  Israel's domestic intelligence service apparently obtained a media gag order on the story, and the original article was pulled from the web within hours of being posted.  But the public's curiosity, both in Israel and around the world was aroused: who was this mysterious prisoner? Why was he being held incommunicado?  The details published in the YNet piece were certainly tantalizing . . . As summarized by Richard Spencer and Adrian Blomfield, writing for The Telegraph:
"Quoting unidentified officials within the Israeli penitentiary service, [the YNet article] disclosed that Mr. X was being held in Unit 15, a wing of Ayalon prison that contains a single cell.

He is not though to receive any visitors and his wing is cut off from the rest of the prison by double iron doors. So hermetic are the conditions in which he is held that other prisoners can neither see nor hear him.

"He is simply a person without a name and without an identity who has been placed in total and utter isolation from the outside world," a prison official was quoted as saying."
The story was quite a conundrum.  A modern-day "Man in the Iron Mask": identity-less, unseen, unheard . . . At the time, opinions were rife about Prisoner X's identity.  The "journalist" Richard Silverstein (he of the oft-vaunted, but frequently wrong, anonymous sources) insisted that Prisoner X was an Iranian general, abducted by the Mossad while on a trip to Turkey.  (As the narrator to the ABC investigative piece on Prisoner X somewhat snarkily put it, see below, Silverstein's theory "went nowhere.")  Others, apparently much closer to the mark, saw Prisoner X's case as somehow involving espionage.  Regardless of the theories, the media gag-order effectively ended Israeli reporting on the case, and so, as no one else was talking/reporting, the whole thing remained a mystery.

Ben Zygier
Until this past Tuesday, that is, when the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) published a story and ran an investigative report (see below) naming Ben Zygier, an Australian national who had immigrated to Israel in 1994, as Prisoner X.  The revelation threw many segments of the media, blogosphere, and Israeli public into an uproar, reignited interest in the two-year-old mystery, and created a host of new and curious questions.  Prisoner X now had a name, but the crime Ben Zygier allegedly committed remained - and remains - unexplained.

The espionage angle, however, appears to currently be the favored theory as to why Zygier was imprisoned in such solitary conditions.  Zygier, apparently, was involved with the Mossad, Israel's secretive national intelligence organization, and he may have been involved in efforts by the agency to obtain false passports - specifically, Australian passports - for its operatives.

In a story in the Weekly Standard, ex-Mossad operative Michael Ross describes the Mossad's need for travel and identity documents as the agency's "Achilles heel," explaining that, unlike the spooks of most Western intelligence services, Israeli operatives typically cannot travel to the locations where they most need to conduct intelligence gathering and espionage activity using Israeli documentation.  Aside from Egypt and Jordan, no Arab or Muslim country - particularly long-standing Israeli enemies like Iran, Lebanon, and Syria - will permit Israeli citizens with Israeli passports to enter.  Indeed, those traveling to the Middle East with plans of traveling to both Israel and to some of the surrounding Arab countries should typically have Israeli customs agents stamp a separate sheet of paper rather than a passport page; some of the Arab countries will, supposedly, turn you away at the border if you are found to have traveled to Israel beforehand.

Anyway, Mr. Ross speculates that Zygier was involved in Mossad attempts to obtain false Australian passport documents - a mission that was fraught with risk, since, in 2004, two Mossad agents were arrested in Australia for doing precisely the same thing.  Ross continues:
"I suspect that ASIO approached Zygier during this period and notified him that they had compelling evidence he was a Mossad operative. From here on in, it could be that by using whatever leverage at their disposal, ASIO “turned” Zygier and he essentially became caught between the two services. Perhaps in return for not making the story public, and as a means to protect his family, Zygier elected to spy for Australia reporting on his activities within the Mossad. It may also be conjectured that through some incident, his activities drew the suspicion of the Mossad and his role as a “double” was revealed. It would appear that whatever transpired was as much an embarrassment Australia as it was for Israel."
I'm no expert on espionage (or am I? *shifty eyes.* No, no I'm not), but, to me at least, Mr. Ross's theory sounds very plausible.

Still, many questions remain, and, with luck, the world will get some more answers soon: today, the Israeli Knesset Intelligence Subcommittee agreed to undertake an independent investigation into Ben Zygier's jailing and suicide.  Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu defended Israel's treatment of Zygier, insisting that Israel is "an exemplary democracy and maintain[s] the rights of those under investigation," but that the country is also "more threatened and face[s] more challenges; [and], therefore, [] must maintain proper activity of [its] security agencies.”

I, for one, am quite curious as to where this case will go, and will try to keep my eyes and ears open for developments.  For now, though, let's go to that videotape promised in the title to this post: the original Australian Broadcasting Company investigative report, for anyone interested.

Friday, February 8, 2013

(Don't Fear) The MQ-9 Reaper: The Department of Justice White Paper and the Targeted Killing of American Citizens

Disclaimer: this blog post is not meant to be a sign of support for the overarching policy of targeted-killings-by-drone that the United States has pursued in the Middle East, the Asian Subcontinent, and Africa over the past nine years.  There are certainly significant consequences to the use of drones - including civilian casualties, missed targets, and the effects of drone use on foreign public opinion - that go well beyond any strictly legal analysis of drone-based targeted killing.  That said, these issues will not be addressed in this blog post, which strictly discusses the rationale of the DoJ whitepaper that was recently released.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unless you've been hiding under a rock (or just busy) for the past few days, you've no doubt heard about the Department of Justice memo on targeted killing that was leaked to NBC news on Monday.  And hoo boy what a stink it's caused, especially in the Right Wing Blogosphere and among a host of (*cough* hypocritical *cough*) conservative pundits.   I mean, did you know that the Obama Administration thinks it's honkey-dorey to ASSASSINATE AMERICAN CITIZENS without DUE PROCESS?!  For all the subtlety of their headlines and arguments, the whole lot of them may as well have pooled together and said, in the immortal words of Antoine Dodson: "Hide yo' kids, hide yo' wife, and hide yo' husband, cuz they dronin' e'erbody out here."

Conservative Punditocracy to the Average American: "Do
not ask for whom the Predator drone hums . . . it hums for thee."

Source: PolicyMic, "Predator Drone Strikes"
(As an aside, left wing pundits have been no less hypocritical in their *support* for the DoJ whitepaper.  MSNBC's typically far-left punditocracy - including "people's rights come from the government" Touré, Chris "Tingles" Matthews, and Rachel Maddow - weighed in in favor of the targeted killing policy, and the network's Krystal Ball went full hack and decided to just come out and say what everyone who listened to the original MSNBC slobberfest already knew: that these same pundits would *not* have supported the *exact same* policy had it been implemented by George W. Bush. So, yes, there's plenty of hackery and hypocrisy to go around . . .)

But, back to business.  The level of hysteria over the targeted killing memo has somewhat confused me, and not just because of its mystical ability to turn cable news into a "Through the Looking Glass" topsy-turvy laugh-fest (as if it wasn't already).  This is largely because, even from reading the first page of the memo, the DoJ's central caveat is obvious: the memo *does not* provide a legal justification for the targeted killing of Americans.  It provides a legal justification for the targeted killing of Americans . . . who are operational leaders of al-Qaeda, who are residing in a foreign country, and who, for whatever reason, cannot be captured.  Which, of course, is not necessarily a good thing or a good policy.  But there is a world of difference between "The DoJ Believes the Government Can Kill American Citizens Without Due Process!" and "The DoJ Believes the Government Can Kill al-Qaeda Leaders, Who Happen to be American Citizens, with Minimal Due Process."

Literally the end of the very first paragraph of the DoJ memo.
Note the phrase "only where the following three conditions are met."
I was relieved to find that I was not the only person who picked up the distinction, and, luckily, those who did are a lot smarter and more articulate than I am.  In fact, why are you even reading this blog when you could be reading:
The point is that the DoJ memo doesn't give the Obama Administration a license to kill any thought-criminal or Republican that it happens to be annoyed with this week.  It's a limited legal opinion, applied in limited circumstances, to a relatively small group of individuals.  

In fact, with the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki (who, as Clint Watts points out, was likely the very person whose targeting the DoJ white paper was written to justify) and Inspire magazine editor Samir Khan, I don't know if there are currently *any* American members of al-Qaeda who are sufficiently "senior" to fall within the white paper's definition of who could be legally targeted.  A case might be made for targeting Adam Gadahn, al-Qaeda Central's Oregon-born media advisor, spokesperson, and propagandist . . . but even this might be stretching the definition of "senior operational leader" a bit far.  While there are certainly other Americans who have joined al-Qaeda or its regional affiliates (Somalia's al-Shabaab seems to be a particularly popular choice for American terrorist wannabes, though some have found the experience to be a lot less fun than they were expecting), they are all comparatively small fry.  I would personally be curious to hear just who - if anyone - still falls within the ambit of this DoJ memo.

As for the memo's legal reasoning, well . . . it might be a little strained, but I don't think it's necessarily unreasonable.  The "Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test" referenced at several points throughout the memo is a somewhat arcane (to non-lawyers/law students) test that is very, very significant in the field of administrative law.  The test is used to determine what level of process is due to a person who is being deprived of liberty, property, or now, apparently, life resulting from the action of an administrative agency.  The test stipulates that three factors must be considered:
  1. The private interest that would be effected by government actions
  2. The risk of an erroneous deprivation and the likely benefit of additional procedural safeguards
  3. The government's asserted interest
Typically, a less significant private interest, a low risk of erroneous deprivation, a low probability that additional procedural safeguards will lead to a greater degree of certainty with respect to an action, and a high government interest are all factors that cut in favor of a lower level of due process (for example, no constitutional requirement that a hearing take place prior to the deprivation of liberty/property).  The opposite, of course, cuts in favor of more significant procedural safeguards (e.g. pre-deprivation hearings that operate more like a traditional trial).

Now what, you might ask, does some administrative law mumbo jumbo have to do with the laws of war?  Good question, and the answer lies in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), which, as you might have noticed, is also cited throughout the DoJ white paper.  In Hamdi, a case in which an American citizen held at Guantanamo Bay sued the Bush Administration challenging his detention and demanding access to the evidence against him, the Supreme Court pulled the Mathews Test completely out of its bag of tricks (NEITHER party had cited Mathews in its briefs to the Court!) to effect a compromise between Hamdi's position and that of the US government.  Based on Hamdi's important liberty interest in, you know, not being imprisoned in Gitmo for the rest of his life and due to the moderate risk of an erroneous deprivation (e.g. was Hamdi really al-Qaeda? He, like hundreds of others, was picked up by Afghanistan's Northern Alliance and turned over to the US later...), the Court ruled that American citizens like Hamdi who were challenging their enemy combatant status need to be provided with a greater amount of due process.  Specifically, they ought to 1) receive notice of the factual basis of their classifications as enemy combatants, and 2) receive a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.  Recognizing that the Government, too, had important interests, however, the Court also ruled that at such hearings before a neutral decision-maker, there would be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government’s evidence and hearsay evidence would be allowed.  It's not a perfect decision, by any means, but it incorporated (bizarrely) a key administrative law tool into a wartime scenario, laying the groundwork for a (somewhat) more clear-cut way of making procedural due process determinations with respect to armed conflicts.

By extending the reasoning in Hamdi and applying the Mathews balancing factors, the DoJ memo is drawing two central conclusions: 1) the US Government's interest in protecting its citizens and homeland from attack outweighs the interests that American citizen "senior operational leaders of al-Qaeda" have in continuing to live and plot, and 2) the risk of erroneous targeted killings (e.g. the targeting and killing of an American citizen who is not a "senior operational leader of al-Qaeda) is low and will not be made any lower by the creation of additional procedural safeguards.  It's a pretty big jump from Hamdi, but, again, it's not completely unreasonable.  And let me reiterate that, by its very language, the memo only applies this logic to "senior operational leaders" of al-Qaeda "in a foreign country."

This, however, is where the ACTUAL arguments against the DoJ white paper can really come into play, because, at least in my opinion, the idea that additional procedural safeguards - say, the creation of a special court that reviews the evidence against an al-Qaeda leader and issues the final decision on whether to drone or not to drone - are unnecessary comes off as at once naive and a little sinister.  I'm no fan of al-Qaeda, but, if we're going to keep the drone program, I'd at least like to see a greater degree of judicial oversight with respect to who deserves to have a Hellfire missile dropped on them.

While, as I hope that I and others have shown, the average American has little to worry about with respect to the DoJ's targeted killing memo, I think that, perhaps, the memo has led to an important conversation about drones and their use (discounting, of course, the paranoid ramblings or the slobbering sycophancy of the punditocracy).  Because with John Brennan up for Director of the CIA, the US drone policy is - without the limits that a public conversation on the issue may potentially create - likely to continue apace.  Or, to put it another way: John Brennan and the counter-terror establishment have a fever . . . and currently the only prescription is more cowbell.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Triomphe to the Sound of a Grunting Camel: François Hollande, Victorious

French President François Hollande arrived in Mali yesterday to survey the results of France's victory over radical Islamist groups who had seized control of Azawad (Northern Mali) and to meet with Malian leaders.  Where French military victors of old were saluted with trumpets and brass bands, Mr. Hollande, upon arriving in Timbuktu, was greeted by Malian singers and presented with the gift of one extremely cranky (or extremely constipated) camel:



I want to let it be known right now that if I am ever responsible for a military victory sufficiently important to warrant an honorific greeting ceremony and the presentation of gifts, it better be as awesome as this one.  If all I get is a crappy brass band, well . . . that event planner will be thanked with a one-way ticket to Guantanamo Bay.  But I digress . . .

Three weeks since France initiated Opération Serval to free northern Mali from Islamists aligned with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), French gains are certainly something to be celebrated.  Islamist fighters have been driven from most of Azawad's major cities, and the civilian population - which has suffered for nearly a year under the Islamists' puritanical, uncompromising version of shari'a law - are once again able to enjoy the basic freedoms and activities that were denied them by the Islamists:
"Music is a pleasure for us . . . We can now dance and do whatever we want: We can walk together with women, we can shout, we're the young people of Timbuktu, this is what we like doing."

"We can chit-chat with our brothers, our friends, and even our boyfriends . . . . It's a real pleasure, we're so happy. I want to thank God." (BBC News - "Mali conflict: Timbuktu celebrates end of Islamist rule")
Women are free to wear what they wish, no longer confined to the niqab.  Men can once again play sports in the streets.  No longer are brutal punishments such as amputations or whippings carried out in the town squares.

And so it is that Mr. Hollande arrived in Mali yesterday to a hero's welcome, the kind of jubilant gratitude that former President George W. Bush could only have dreamt about from the citizens of liberated Iraq or Afghanistan, or that even President Obama would be unlikely to receive from the fractious tribes of post-Gaddafi Libya.  (Indeed, it is my fervent belief that President Bush would have greatly preferred receiving a camel - even a constipated one - to the gift of shoes that he was so infamously given during a Baghdad press conference.)

But while President Hollande is currently riding high, the French victory - and Malian peace - is by no means assured.  As many have pointed out, comparatively few Islamist fighters have been killed in the French campaign.  Most have fled into the mountains and deserts, lurking in the redoubts and hiding places that the GSPC (e.g. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat - the Algerian jihadist group that later evolved into AQIM) formerly called home.  And it is there they will likely stay - unless someone (*cough* the French *cough*) roots them out or until they see new opportunities to exert themselves.  The Islamist groups of the Sahel did a brisk business in smuggling, kidnapping for profit, and other criminal enterprises before they got into the whole "seizing-control-of-countries" game.  They are perfectly capable of maintaining their strength and keeping their coffers full without the bother that administrating a state (even through the relatively simplistic methods of brutality and fear) entails.

Thus, the measure of Opération Serval, like the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq before it, will come not from the initial victory - which, as Hollande's visit shows, has already largely been achieved - but from the standpoint of long-term stability.  Will the Islamists return if given the chance?  Will Mali descend into tit-for-tat recriminations, or, worse, full-blown ethnic conflict?  Will the French stay (Hollande told a crowd in the Malian capitol of Bamako that "We will be with you to the end," and also stated that the French would stay in Mali "as long as necessary") or quickly hand over military responsibility of the country to the not-exactly-stellar Malian security forces?

These are all questions that will be answered in time.  Until then, however, I hope that Mr. Hollande can occasionally take some time off from presidentin' to enjoy his camel.  Picturing him riding it up and down the Champs-Élysées (and imagining it growling at unsuspecting Parisians) brings nothing but joy to my heart.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

More stories/video about President Hollande's visit to Mali:
Hollande Meets with Mali's Interim Leader in Sevare:


Al Jazeera: "Hollande Says Mali War is Not Over":


France's Hollande visits library housing torched manuscripts in Timbuktu:

Wednesday, January 30, 2013

Torture and Art in Wars on Terror: Epilogue

I wrote in my initial post that I wasn't going to go on a long-winded tirade about "how torture is wrong."  And I feel like I held myself to that pretty well.  But, now that that's done, it's time to rant, because during my research (*cough* reading Twitter and online news *cough*) for this series of blog posts, I came across a Tweet that I think perfectly exemplifies one of the most significant moral problems that arises from ZD30.


My first response upon reading this tweet was to do the most epic Picard Facepalm since the good Captain immortalized that time-honored technique.  My second was to immediately screenshot the damn thing, because surely the author would realize the all-kinds-of-stupid nonsense she/he had just written and try and delete the evidence as quickly as possible.  In this, however, I was wrong... the tweet is currently still online; even after some more charitable tweeps corrected this person's misperception, she/he maintained that waterboarding didn't look much like torture compared to "the stuff you see in real movies." Again, cue Captain Picard.

But then I had a terrible realization.  Contrary to my initial perception, this tweet (while still pretty stupid) might not be all that unsurprising for two reasons: 1) many individuals, and even some who still wield political power in the United States government, continue to parse a distinction between "enhanced interrogation" and torture; and 2) many individuals know about waterboarding on a theoretical level, but they don't fully understand what it is or what its effects are.

Source: "Torture on Trial," Link TV Documentary
This probably is not helped by the oft-repeated explanation that waterboarding merely "simulates the sensation of drowning."  To say that the technique simply "simulates" this terrifying sensation gives the impression that there is really no danger to the individual being waterboarded - in the same sense as, say, a paintball game "simulates" the sensation of being in a gun-battle with none of the attendant risks of serious injury or death.  This makes waterboarding out to be more of a ruse or a trick than a torture technique.  The reality is much grimmer.  As the late Christopher Hitchens - who allowed himself to be waterboarded for a Vanity Fair story - described it: "You feel that you are drowning because you are drowning — or, rather, being drowned, albeit slowly and under controlled conditions and at the mercy (or otherwise) of those who are applying the pressure."  Feel free to watch Mr. Hitchens being waterboarded; the footage is on YouTube.  See how long he lasts, and how very little water it takes for a man to break.

Many reviews of Zero Dark Thirty have lauded the fact that Bigelow pulled no punches in the scenes depicting the United States' "enhanced interrogation" practices.  It is impossible to view the movie, these reviewers insist, without being able to understand that the waterboarding, sexual humiliation, physical restraint, beatings, stress positions, and other practices shown are clearly acts of torture.  To a large extent, I agree with this analysis.  I know that I found those scenes to be difficult to watch, and the film's opening interrogation sequence chilled me, a feeling that I was unable to shake throughout the entire movie.  Most horrible of all was the scene in which Ammar, sexually humiliated ("You don't mind if my female colleague sees your junk?") and left alone with Maya, begs her to help him.  Her cold response, "You can help yourself by being truthful," and the fear and pain in his puffy, sleep-deprived eyes made me disgusted and ashamed.  Perhaps it was meant to.  As the reviewers I've cited note, it certainly seems hard to imagine that anyone could watch these scenes and not believe that what they were seeing was torture.

And yet . . .  And yet I wonder.  Because it is still hard for me to imagine that, over a decade after the waterboarding/"enhanced interrogation" debate began, anyone could have written the Tweet I posted above.  And I see the rave reviews that people have given Zero Dark Thirty, the "hooah!" audience response, the thrilled Tweets of "best movie ever, OMG!!! <3", and the gleeful "I-told-you-sos" in some quarters that yes, of course, enhanced interrogation made the difference in the hunt for bin Laden - and, again, I wonder.

Because there's that statement, lingering on the tweetdeck of our unfortunate Tweep subject, above: that what was portrayed in Zero Dark Thirty "didn't look much like torture compared to the stuff you see in real movies."  I wonder how many of the film's viewers agree with that statement.  Because, at some level, it's true, isn't it?  Nothing in ZD30 seems quite as brutal as James Bond getting his testicles pounded on with a length of rope in Casino Royale.  No detainees' body parts are cut off, there are no mock executions, and there are no forms of penetrative torture (e.g. gunshots, stabbing, etc.) à la 24.  Nobody is tortured via electric shock, as Liam Neeson tortures his daughter's kidnapper in Taken.  Are these the only kinds of things that rise to the level of "real" torture?  Certainly not.  As the great anti-Soviet novelist and crusader Aleksander Solzhenitsyn wrote in the first volume of his expansive Gulag Archipelago, even such a seemingly mundane thing as sleep deprivation - one of the comparatively "lighter" forms of "enhanced interrogation" that the viewer witnesses in Zero Dark Thirty - can be an extremely potent form of torture:
"Sleeplessness (yes, combined with standing, thirst, bright light, terror, and the unknown — what other tortures are needed!?) befogs the reason, undermines the will, and the human being ceases to be himself, to be his own "I." . . . .

. . . . Here is how one victim . . . describes his feelings after this torture [e.g. sleep deprivation]: ". . . . Irises of the eyes dried out as if someone were holding a red-hot iron in front of them. Tongue swollen from thirst and prickling as from a hedgehog at the slightest movement. Throat racked by spasms of swallowing."

Sleeplessness was a great form of torture: it left no visible marks and could not provide grounds for complaint even if an inspection — something unheard of anyway — were to strike on the morrow.

'They didn't let you sleep? Well, after all, this is not supposed to be a vacation resort. The Security officials were awake too!'" (The Gulag Archipelago: 1918 - 1956 Vol. 1, pg. 112)
But . . . it doesn't look like the torture you see in "real" movies.  It doesn't seem as brutal as the cinematic depictions of torture I've described above.  And, after all, we got bin Laden . . . .

How many people, then, are willing to view the torture scenes in Zero Dark Thirty and think to themselves, like Solzhenitsyn's imaginary NKVD agent (the NKVD preceded the KGB as the Soviet Union's secret police force), "they didn't let you sleep and played loud music?  Well, this isn't supposed to be a vacation resort!"  "Oh, they stuffed you in a box?  But, after all, you are a Very Bad Person and, really, it's not SUCH a terrible thing."  "Sure, you were put in a collar and paraded about half-naked like a dog, but it's not like we subjected you to Real Torture™like you see in the movies."

Compounding the effects of these sorts of justifications is the fact that all of the detainees who are tortured in Zero Dark Thirty are portrayed as being connected, in one way or another, to al-Qaeda.  This brings to mind another Solzhenitsyn reference: the chilling title to his book We Never Make Mistakes.  It is comparatively easy to justify torture in the world of Zero Dark Thirty, where the tactic not only works, but is only ever employed against people who we know, 100%, to be actual terrorists.  In the real world, however, everyone - even, and perhaps especially, US intelligence - makes mistakes.  Not everyone who was interrogated during the "enhanced interrogation" program was guilty, either by association or otherwise; indeed, some unfortunate, innocent people paid the ultimate price as a result of their mistaken arrest and "interrogation" by the United States.

This is not to denigrate the ultimate conclusion of Zero Dark Thirty.  I certainly believe that bin Laden got what was coming to him, and for those who want to dismiss the SEAL raid that killed him as a mere "assassination" I have nothing but contempt.  But at what moral cost was this great victory obtained?  Zero Dark Thirty, as we've seen over the course of the past few blog posts, certainly doesn't examine this question in any meaningful way.  Instead, it provides an action movie apologia for torture that at least some people (those who don't view the "enhanced interrogation" methods as rising to the level of Real Torture) seem to be interpreting as, "what we did wasn't so bad . . . and it worked!"  The vocal, visceral positive responses to the film that I've seen both online and in person (my entire theater applauded at the end of the movie; I'm willing to bet cash money that yours did, too) seem to indicate that, whatever the moral cost of torture might be, it's a cost that by the end of the film most, or, at least, many, are willing to bear.

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Torture and Art in Wars on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of "Zero Dark Thirty" and "The Battle of Algiers" (Part 3 - Zero Dark Thirty)

And now, ladies and gentlemen, we come to the finale of our examination, although, ironically, the subject is the basis of our whole discussion.  Having discussed the depiction of torture in The Battle of Algiers, we finally turn to Zero Dark Thirty.  Given my thesis that The Battle of Algiers succeeds in portraying terror in a nuanced way and that ZD30 does not, we now have to compare the two movies to determine where, exactly, the difference lies.

Let me start out by acknowledging that ZD30 is very good movie.  Katheryn Bigelow is an exceptional director, and the Oscar she won for The Hurt Locker was well deserved.  ZD30 is yet more evidence (as if any were needed) of her skills: the film is slick, well-paced, and many of its shots are downright beautiful.  And, of course, the climactic storming of bin Laden's Abbottabad compound was a cinematic thrill unlike any that is likely to be seen on the silver screen for some time.

But the aspects of the film that some people have claimed gives the movie the moral complexity to be a masterpiece - specifically, its focus on "enhanced interrogation" and its obvious message that torture provided the leads that led to Osama bin Laden's killing - in my mind, at least, do precisely the opposite.  If the use and depiction of torture in The Battle of Algiers provides an example of a film that treats torture in both a morally and situationally complex way, the depiction of torture in ZD30 provides merely an illusion complexity.

As an initial matter, for the purpose of this analysis let us begin by crediting (whether we believe them or not) three of the core presumptions that ZD30 seems to make:
  • First, that none of the detainees who are tortured in the course of the "enhanced interrogation" program are innocent - all are, in some way or another, connected to al-Qaeda
  • Second, that torture is effective - it results in accurate, actionable intelligence
  • Third, that, more specifically, torture was essential to the discovery and elimination of Osama bin Laden himself
OK.  So . . . if we credit these points, we, the viewers, are left in roughly the same situation in which we found ourselves at the beginning of The Battle of Algiers.  Torture works, and torture helps you succeed.  So what is it that makes the movies so utterly different?

Failure to Seriously Examine Torture-as-Tactic:
I'll begin with an observation based more on artistic style and story-telling than anything else.  As I noted in the previous post, The Battle of Algiers provides the viewer with the movie's (quasi) outcome at the beginning of the film: the French eliminate the FLN and "win" the Battle of Algiers.  The rest of the film is a deeper, darker journey through the struggle between the FLN and the French - the roots of the FLN's urban guerilla campaign, the atrocities committed by both sides, the strikes, the press conferences, the torture, the systematic elimination of the FLN's executive bureau.  And then, at the very end, we have the historical version of the classic "twist" ending: despite Colonel Mathieu and his troops' destruction of the FLN's organization, the Algerian people rise up and France eventually has to abandon its former colony.  The entire movie, then, is not only an attempt to understand the complexity of the conflict in the city Algiers; it is, itself, an explanation for the eventual failure of France's colonial venture in Algeria.

Contrast this with ZD30, which is not, and, granted, is not meant to be, an overarching examination of the United States' War on Terror.  ZD30 is, above all else, a detective story and thriller.  Thus, it follows the typical detective story/thriller plot layout: a crime is committed (9/11); which sets in motion an investigation; which results in leads/clues, but also leads to obstacles; these obstacles are overcome, and the leads/clues are used to solve the crime or capture the criminal. Or, in this case, kill the criminal. In this kind of set-up, there is no reflection.  There is only forward momentum.  Whereas torture in The Battle of Algiers was both a device for propelling the plot and a central moral theme, torture in ZD30 is simply the former: it's the tool that gets the leads, sets further detective work in motion, and, eventually, results in the killing of bin Laden.

Worse still, torture is not merely a tool: it is an unexamined one.  ZD30 contains none of the back-story or explanation that makes up a significant portion of The Battle of Algiers.  ZD30's CIA personnel never really discuss torture - no justification is given for its use, no defense of the tactic is employed, indeed, its use and efficacy are never questioned by anybody.

Now, one could argue that, surely, the film's brief opening scene (a blank screen with real, heartbreaking audio from 9/11 emergency calls playing in the background) provides the justification for the torture we see committed by the CIA seconds later.  But I find this argument unpersuasive.  The 9/11 attacks were terrible.  But so was Pearl Harbor.  So was every battle during World War II (and many of these battles involved death tolls far in excess of 9/11).  I can understand the visceral terror and shock of watching as the heart of America was attacked on national television - hell, I remember it, I was there watching with everyone else.  But tell me this: have you ever seen a World War II film (that is, one that's not directed by Quentin Tarantino) in which American troops make a habit of torturing Nazi or Japanese prisoners?  I can't think of a single WWII film in which American troops are portrayed as torturers, much less one in which atrocities or violence by America's enemies was used as a justification for widespread torture.  What is it that makes the 9/11 attacks so different that ZD30 can take the US from Ground Zero to torture in the span of about two minutes?

I'll grant the possibility that Bigelow's juxtaposition of 9/11 and torture at the beginning of the movie was artistic, perhaps meant to symbolize the panicked and unreflective speed with which the Bush Administration instituted the "enhanced interrogation" program.  But given the ultimate trajectory of the film and its overwhelmingly positive portrayal of torture (see above and below), I can't say that this artistic choice was successful, if, indeed, it was intended at all.  And so the viewer is left with torture that simply is.  There is no explanation for it; no justification for it.  Why did we do it - was it out of malice (revenge), fear, an honest belief that it was the only way we could present future attacks?  The movie comes closest to endorsing the third possibility - or, at least, that's my interpretation of Bigelow's continuous use of depictions of real-life terrorist attacks (the London 7/7 bombings, the Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing, the Camp Chapman suicide attack, and the attempted bombing of New York's Times Square) to punctuate the plot at various points in the movie.  But we don't know, because, throughout, the use of torture is simply unexamined.

Lack of Moral Complexity:
ZD30's failure to seriously examine the roots of torture in the aftermath of 9/11 leads to my second point: unlike many of the critics who have lauded ZD30 for its "brave" and "honest" portrayal of torture, I would disagree with the proposition that the movie is morally complex.  It isn't.  While you could argue this point at some theoretical level, reading into the movie's so-called "subtext," the film itself is unequivocally pro-torture.  In fact, to the extent that it is mentioned or recognized at all, nearly every reference to "enhanced interrogation" in the movie is laudatory: as Noah Millman writes in a mostly positive review of the film for "The American Conservative,"
"Down the line, top to bottom, nobody ever says anything critical about the torture of prisoners. Multiple times, after torture ceases, CIA officers complain that they can’t get good information anymore now that they can’t torture suspects. Nobody contradicts them."
And so it is.  The only negative things said about torture in the film come not from any moral or philosophical opposition to the tactic, but, much more practically, from political considerations. At one point in the film, Dan, the CIA operative who acts as ZD30's torturer-in-chief (ironically, also my favorite character... though for entirely different reasons), tells Maya that the political winds are changing and that she ought to consider getting out of the torture business because she won't "want to be the last one holding a dog-collar."  In another scene, of a strategy session between Maya and two of her CIA colleagues, a television in the background is playing a speech by President Obama decrying the use of torture and issuing an executive order halting the "enhanced interrogation" program.  The looks on the faces of Maya and her colleagues are completely non-plussed.  They may as well have rolled their eyes.  "Of course those politicians would be saying such things," they seem to think, "but us, here on the ground? We know better."

I'll end this section with a block-quote from Rolling Stone's Matt Taibbi.  Although he is writer with whom I frequently disagree, and vociferously, he pretty much nailed his review of ZD30 (ominously entitled "Zero Dark Thirty Is Osama bin Laden's Last Victory Over America"), in which he writes,
"Bigelow put [torture] in, which was "honest," but it seems an eerie coincidence that she was "honest" about torture in pretty much exactly the way a CIA interrogator would have told the story, without including much else.

There's no way to watch Zero Dark Thirty without seeing it as a movie about how torture helped us catch Osama bin Laden. . . . . This was definitely not a movie about two vicious and murderous groups of people killing and torturing each other in an endless cycle of increasingly brainless revenge. And this was not a movie about how America lost its values en route to a great strategic victory. No, this was a straight-up "hero catches bad guys" movie, and the idea that audiences weren't supposed to identify with Maya the torturer is ludicrous."
This is absolutely correct.

Grand Scale (or "Second-Tier") Consequences:
My final critique in this comparison of ZD30 with The Battle of Algiers lies in the realm of what I'll call "second-tier consequences."  In my mind, the term "first-tier consequences" would describe the negative consequences that occur during or as an immediate result of torture - for instance, the moral degradation of the torturer; the risk of torturing an innocent person or one who does not have/know the information the torturer is seeking; the obtaining of false or exaggerated intelligence, given simply to make the torture stop; and similar problems.  Note that, because we have accepted ZD30's presumptions about torture - that it works, that it produces useful and actionable intelligence, and that none of its victims are actually innocent - we have wholly eliminated a discussion of the "first-tier consequences" that would obviously be integral to any analysis of the real-life "enhanced interrogation" program.

But the "second-tier consequences"?  Whole different ballgame.  These are the negative secondary effects of torture: the loss of stature and support for the United States among its allies, the cementing of the US image as "oppressor" to those already predisposed to think of it as such, the domestic horror and subsequent decline in public support for America's international actions.  And it is in this realm that ZD30 truly falls short.

Sure, in ZD30-land torture helped Maya and the CIA find and kill bin Laden.  But this is a cause-and-effect relationship that occurs only in the film's detective/manhunt/thriller vacuum.  In the movie's single-minded focus on Maya's hunt for bin Laden, nobody - not Bigelow, not Maya, not any other character - mentions or even considers the effects that torture might have in the wider world.  Which, in the context of a global War on Terrorism, is actually pretty freaking important.

Recall, as we saw in my last blog post, that the French military's use of torture in The Battle of Algiers resulted in a deeper level of alienation among the Algerian populace and a marked increase in their anti-French and anti-colonial sentiments.  Eventually, the film insinuates, it was these factors, bubbling to the surface in widespread public demonstration, and not the FLN's bombs and assassinations that doomed France's colonial control over Algeria.

As those of us who live in the real world know from painful experience, the United States and its interests around the world have suffered less dramatic, but by no means unimportant, repercussions as a result of the "enhanced interrogation" program.  The infamous images of torture at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison decimated the United States' image as Iraq's liberator, poured fuel on the flames of the growing Iraqi insurgency, and jilted the American public's support for the war.  Reports of prisoner abuse and Qur'an desecration at Guantanamo resulted in deadly riots in Afghanistan and in other locations around the Arab World.  And with each report of torture in Iraq, in Afghanistan, at Guantanamo, or at some secret CIA black site, more American stature was lost and the United States' insistence that it merely sought to bring freedom and democracy to the world rang more hollow.  There is a quote in the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Handbook (circa 2007):
"Any human rights abuses or legal violations committed by U.S. forces quickly become known throughout the local populace and eventually around the world. Illegitimate actions undermine both long- and short-term COIN [counter-insurgency] efforts."
Talk about an understatement.

But just as ZD30 fails to examine any other aspect of torture, so, too, does it fail to examine torture's second-tier consequences.  Iraq is never mentioned.  Global public opinion is never mentioned.  The Muslim world's opinion of the United States is never mentioned.  Neither Maya nor any of her CIA superiors seem to consider or care about whether their efforts are really the best strategy for eliminating global terror - whether they are really effectively preventing attacks and knocking off terrorists, or are merely nurturing the resentments that will lead to greater anti-American sentiment, strengthen radical Islamists, and result in yet more terror.

It is questions like that that a serious, nuanced examination of torture would have produced, and it is questions like that which fall by the wayside in the heady, heart-thumping adrenaline rush of the film's ending.  Because, hey, they got bin Laden.

Monday, January 21, 2013

Torture & Art in Wars on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of "Zero Dark Thirty" and "The Battle of Algiers" (Part 2 - Battle of Algiers)

"The basis of our job is intelligence. The method: interrogation. Conducted in such a way to ensure that we always get an answer. In our situation, false humanitarian considerations can only lead to despair and confusion. I am certain that all units will understand and react accordingly."
                                                                         -
Colonel Mathieu, The Battle of Algiers 
Alright, folks, we are back again for the second post in our multi-part comparison of artistic depictions of torture in Zero Dark Thirty (ZD30) and The Battle of Algiers.  This post will focus on the latter of the two films, while a discussion of ZD30 itself will largely be reserved for the next post.

Why The Battle of Algiers?
Perhaps the first question that should be asked and answered is, "why are we comparing ZD30 to The Battle of Algiers, rather than, say, 24, Homeland, or some other more modern cinematic allegory or depiction of the War on Terror?"

There are two main reasons that I selected The Battle of Algiers as the subject of this comparative analysis.  The first is fairly straightforward: unlike most of the post-9/11 films/television programs that depict or allegorize the War on Terror, The Battle of Algiers is, like ZD30, a fictionalized representation of real events.  Where ZD30 tells the story of the United States' 10-year hunt for Osama bin Laden after the September 11 terrorist attacks (which the movie bills as the "Greatest Manhunt in History"), The Battle of Algiers depicts one of the pivotal moments in the Algerian War: the titular Battle of Algiers, in which urban guerillas aligned with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) engaged in a protracted campaign of bombings and shootings against French interests in the Algerian capitol.  In response, the French dispatched General Jacques Massu and a division of French paratroopers, who restored order in the restive city through a heavy-handed campaign of coercive interrogations and torture.

And therein lies the second reason for my selection of The Battle of Algiers.  For all their differences - and, indeed, the differences between the films (to say nothing of the real-world situations that inspired them) are profound - ZD30 and The Battle of Algiers share a number of significant similarities: both concern Western nations battling terrorism and the dark extremes that even "civilized" nations will go to protect their perceived interests or accomplish their goals.  Both depict the regional environments in which the respective Western militaries or intelligence agencies must work.  Both acknowledge and depict - although with stark differences with respect to the level of sympathy induced in the viewer - the terrorist actions against which the Western nations are fighting.  And, most importantly for our purposes, the plot lines of both films are intricately bound up with the question of torture.  Indeed, this questionable theme is so significant that both ZD30 and The Battle of Algiers open with scenes involving torture.

(NOTE: for those unfamiliar with The Battle of Algiers, the entire film can currently be viewed on YouTube, although I'd get on that, since it could probably be taken down at any time as a copyright violation)

The Depiction of Torture in The Battle of Algiers:
And now we get to the meat of the matter: the depiction of torture in the The Battle of Algiers and the central role it plays in the film.

As in ZD30, the viewer know what he is getting into as soon as the movie begins: a half-naked man, beaten and dejected, sits in a French interrogation room, as a soldier speaks the film's chilling opening line, "Why couldn't you have talked sooner?  It would have gone easier for you."  The man, who is revealed to have a large burn covering the entire left part of his chest, is then pressed into a French military uniform and brought into the Casbah - the city's largest Arab quarter - to finger the location of the fighter he has given up: Ali La Pointe, the last free FLN member in the city of Algiers.

Street in Algiers' Casbah
Source: Wikimedia Commons
Notice then, what is conveyed even within the first several minutes of The Battle of Algiers: torture has not only been routinized by the French in their battle against the FLN, but, much more significantly, it is effective.  So effective, in fact, that Colonel Mathieu (a composite character representing General Massu and other French military leaders in Algeria) and his men have broken the back of the FLN's organization in Algiers.  La Pointe, betrayed by the man in the film's opening scene and trapped in his hiding place behind a false wall in an apartment bathroom, is the last loose end for the French to tie up. With his death, the French victory in the Battle of Algiers is assured.

Thus, the first several minutes of the film can be summarized in three steps: 1) Western nation tortures in pursuit of its goal; 2) this torture is effective and results in concrete leads; and 3) Western nation is able to follow these leads to achieve its goal.  To boomerang away from the Battle of Algiers for a moment, I will note that this three-step formula is, to a significant degree, a one-sentence plot summary of Zero Dark Thirty - although, admittedly, with two hours of well-developed, well-paced, and interesting detective work (punctuated by repeated al-Qaeda attacks) thrown in for good measure.

But few (decent) movies are willing to give their game away in the first few minutes, and The Battle of Algiers is no exception: the three-step formula described above may be a useful vantage point from which to view the movie's events, but it is merely the surface level of a much deeper - and much more morally convoluted - whole.  Unlike ZD30, which depicts torture as something that simply is, The Battle of Algiers provides the viewer with a much broader picture of torture.  The film examines the spiral of violence between the FLN and the French colonial police/military that led to the tactic's adoption; the physical brutality of the torture methods employed; the justifications offered by the French military; and, perhaps most importantly, the effects of the tactic on the local population and its ultimate failure to save the French colonial venture in Algeria.  This is a nuanced treatment of the question of torture in cinema, and, in the next blog post, I intend to show why ZD30 fails to live up to this thought-provoking standard.

For now, however, let us continue our examination of The Battle of Algiers.  What does the movie do right?

1) Well, for one thing, the film actually talks about torture and refuses to present the tactic as a mere fait accompli or to treat it merely as a very big and very obvious elephant in the room.  As the movie shows, the French police in Algeria were not originally in the torture business: while the police, frustrated at their inability to prevent their own officers from being gunned down by FLN assassins, certainly engaged in some despicable, extralegal tactics (the bombing of a suspected FLN member's family home, for instance) in their attempts to get FLN violence under control, torture was not among them.  However, after a series of FLN bombs kill dozens of French Algerians in near-simultaneous explosions at a restaurant, dance club, and airline ticket counter, the French substantially up their game.  Colonel Mathieu and his paratroopers are deployed to Algiers with orders to crush the FLN.  And so it is that, shortly after their arrival, the viewer is treated to this speech from Colonel Mathieu, briefing his troops on the enemy that they are charged with destroying - a speech that, if disconnected from Algeria's FLN and applied to al-Qaeda and the broader Muslim world, could easily have been given by an American military commander in the years after 9/11:
"There are 400,000 Arabs in Algiers. Are they all our enemies? We know they are not. But a small minority holds sway by means of terror and violence. We must deal with this minority in order to isolate and destroy it. It's a dangerous enemy that works in the open and underground . . . . It's a faceless enemy, unrecognizable, blending in with hundreds of others. . . . . Among all these Arab men and women are the [terrorists]. But who are they? How can we recognize them?" (NOTE: see YouTube film at 55:38 for footage)
Having explained the overarching problem that his troops will face - the problem of determining who is and is not an enemy in a native population of hundreds of thousands of individuals - Colonel Mathieu elaborates their second predicament: the FLN is structured in such a way that its members are insulated from one another.  Each member of the organization knows only three others: the higher-up that recruited that member, and two underling that that member himself recruited. In order to crack the FLN, the French paratroopers must break through this defense by working their way up the chain, eliminating the organization's "triangle" sections one by one until they reach the top: the military head of the FLN.  And how will they do this?  Colonel Mathieu has the answer: the use of what the CIA would later call "enhanced interrogation techniques" to "convince" captured FLN members to finger their immediate superiors in the organization.
"The basis of our job is intelligence. The method: interrogation. Conducted in such a way to ensure that we always get an answer. In our situation, false humanitarian considerations can only lead to despair and confusion. I am certain that all units will understand and react accordingly."
And his paratroopers do understand.  They react accordingly.  And, as the beginning of the movie shows, their tactics meet with resounding success.  But, as the video clip below (depicting a press conference between Mathieu and members of the French-Algerian media) shows, questions remain:


Colonel Mathieu is insistent that the success his troop have achieved is directly related to the tactics they have employed, and he gives the very post-9/11 dismissal to his journalist critics that, "The word 'torture' isn't used in our orders."  He goes on to detail the FLN's strategy of requiring captured members to stay silent for 24 hours after their capture so as to give the organization time to make any information they then give to French authorities useless.  "What form of questioning must we adopt [to combat these tactics?]" Mathieu asks incredulously, "Civil law procedures that take months for a mere misdemeanor?"  He then presents the assembled journalists with his stark picture of the conflict:
"The problem is this: the FLN wants to throw us out of Algeria, and we want to stay. Even with slight shades of opinion you all agree that we must stay. When the FLN rebellion began, there were no shades at all - every paper, the communist [or left-wing] press included, wanted it crushed. . . . . Therefore, it's my turn to ask a question: should France stay in Algeria? If your answer is still 'yes,' then you must accept all the necessary consequences."
It might not be much - e.g. no reporter seriously challenges the paratroopers' use of torture to put down the FLN - but it's something.  The characters in the movie recognize torture as being a subject of significance, whether from a moral or a tactical standpoint, and they discuss it!  Mathieu offers his justifications for the use of torture during the two scenes I've described, and there is at least a little push-back from the assembled reporters ("Legality can be inconvenient").  But the key point is, again, that the question of torture is recognized and discussed, and the viewer, who has been exposed to the atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict, is, for the moment, left to consider whether the tactic can truly be justified.

2) Secondly, The Battle of Algiers does not shy away from depicting the brutality of torture.  Indeed, the scene that follows the press conference scene shown above demonstrates just what grim "necessary consequences" Mathieu is referencing.  It is in this scene - one of the most harrowing in classic cinema (beginning at 1:35:18 in the full-length YouTube video) - that we see the full brutality of Mathieu's techniques.  And this is not "mere" waterboarding - although two forms of water-torture (forced ingestion of water and repeatedly holding a prisoner's head underwater) are depicted.  No, this goes far beyond that: this is torture with blowtorches; torture by hanging bloodied and beaten hog-tied men from the ceiling; and torture by electrocution.

No artistic depiction of torture can be considered honest if it does not convey the horror and brutality involved in such tactics.  In this sense, both The Battle of Algiers and, as we will see, ZD30 succeed.

3) Most significantly, however, The Battle of Algiers shows the ultimate futility - and, indeed, the counter-productivity - of the French military's use of torture.  The French may have won the Battle of Algiers by killing or imprisoning the entire leadership of the FLN, but a battle is not the war, and France's brutal actions in Algiers resulted in a significant increase in the popularity of anti-colonial and anti-French ideology among the native Algerian population.  Left to metastasize for several (relatively) peaceful years, this anti-colonial sentiment burst back into the open in December 1960, with mass demonstrations in support of an independent Algeria.  This is depicted in the film's final 10 minutes, with the film's finale showing a scene from the last day of the 1960 demonstrations while the narrator states that two years later Algeria achieved its independence.

In other words, torture isn't something that occurs in a vacuum.  While it may - and let's really stress that "may" - be useful for achieving certain goals, its consequences and side effects should not be ignored.  Indeed, as The Battle of Algiers shows, the consequences of torture are far more significant than their limited successes: while it is unclear whether France would have been able to maintain control over Algeria without using torture and other brutal tactics to cripple the FLN, its very use of torture and brutality played a central role in turning the native Algerian population against the French and making France's eventual ejection from northern Africa all but certain.  This is one of the key points of the film, and it is a point that other filmmakers, to say nothing of other governments, ought to take note of.

As we will see in the next post (which will likely take several days or so to write . . . sorry), this point is one that was decidedly lost on Kathryn Bigelow when making Zero Dark Thirty.  Rather than depict the large-scale consequences of torture - a precipitous decline in the United States' popularity in the Arab/Muslim World, a loss of stature among even the US's staunchest allies, and justification for greater radicalization and more terrorist attacks - Bigelow chooses, instead, to depict . . . well . . . NO negative consequences of torture.  Not even such comparatively mundane problems as faulty intelligence are treated in Zero Dark Thirty.

But this is the topic of the next post in this series, and I would hate to rant too much about it now.  Until then, I hope you enjoy the early part of your week and I really do recommend that you take some time, if you have it, to watch The Battle of Algiers.  It is truly an excellent film.