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It is likely that, if most Americans were asked to name the central fronts in the continuing battle against al-Qaeda, to the extent they would answer at all, they would cite Afghanistan or Pakistan. Perhaps those who were up on recent news would name Mali. But, after the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in a US drone strike in late September 2011 and the subsequent fading of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from the headlines, comparatively few would name Yemen, the oft-forgotten country occupying the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.
At least one person, however, has not forgotten either Yemen or America's recent foreign policy forays in the country, nor underestimated the continuing significance of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This person, Gregory Johnsen - Yemen expert, former Fulbright Fellow (in Yemen), and PhD candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University - has written a splendid book on the topic: The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia. I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that Mr. Johnsen has written what is currently the preeminent book on al-Qaeda's expansion to Yemen; its early operations there; and its exploitation of the country's porous borders, tribal networks, and lack of strong central governance to expand its numbers and its strength.
Johnsen's story begins, like so many books about al-Qaeda, during the heyday of the Afghan-Soviet War, the 9-year conflict that proved to be the birthplace of the modern radical Islamist/jihadist movement. Following the cast of characters that has become so familiar to counter-terrorism researchers - Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and, of course, Osama bin Laden, as well as lesser-known (but no less significant) figures like Yemeni cleric Abd al-Majid al-Zindani - Johnsen weaves a fine narrative of the importance of the Afghan War to the Arab World, and, specifically, the Yemen, of the 1980s. Additionally, he provides a primer on the development of Osama bin Laden's violent ideology, an offshoot (and significant expansion) of his mentor Azzam's theory that violent jihad in defense of Muslim territory was fard al-ayn (الفرض العين) - an individual duty incumbent on all Muslims.
Equally important to the tale of al-Qaeda in Yemen is bin Laden's post-Afghanistan development of his terrorist organization and the progressive expansion of his ideology from merely battling "non-Islamic" intruders in the Arab world, to attacking the "apostate" governments aligned with the United States; from attacking U.S. interests in the region, to attacking American civilians (regardless of their gender, age, or military/civilian status) in the heart of the United States. Bin Laden had little interest in the United States until the first Gulf War, when, with the acquiescence of the al-Saud monarchy, American troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of the American-led military campaign to expel Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait. Indeed, as Johnsen describes, bin Laden's first post-Afghanistan plot involved jihad against the communist government of what was then South Yemen, directly to the south of bin Laden's home country of Saudi Arabia:
And it is precisely here that we find the crux of Johnsen's story: the growth, decimation, and resurrection of al-Qaeda in Yemen. With a few exceptions (events like the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and names like Anwar al-Awlaki), this story is an unfamiliar one. But it is a fascinating and incredibly informative tale - a tale that should be required reading for anyone interested in al-Qaeda, the War on Terror, or counter-terrorism studies generally. Johnsen details how Yemen's internal politics allowed al-Qaeda to grow and thrive during the early 1990s, as Ali Abdullah Saleh (the President of North Yemen who had recently overseen Yemen's unification with his Southern counterpart, Ali Salim al-Bid) twice allied with Tariq al-Fadhli, bin Laden's lieutenant, in order to strengthen his own power in relation to his rivals in southern Yemen. As Johnsen writes,
Perhaps just as interesting as Johnsen's overarching history of al-Qaeda in Yemen is a comparatively brief interlude in the book's fourth chapter, "Faith and Wisdom," describing the tribulations of Ayman al-Zawahiri's terrorist organization, al-Jihad (aka Egyptian Islamic Jihad), during the mid-1990s and the open revolt of many of the organization's members in the wake of Zawahiri's decision to align al-Jihad with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda in 1998. As Johnsen writes,
Anyway, to wrap it up, I would highly recommend The Last Refuge to anyone interested in counter-terrorism or security studies, Yemen, al-Qaeda, or the Middle East in general. It is an excellent read, and well worth your time and money.
Johnsen's story begins, like so many books about al-Qaeda, during the heyday of the Afghan-Soviet War, the 9-year conflict that proved to be the birthplace of the modern radical Islamist/jihadist movement. Following the cast of characters that has become so familiar to counter-terrorism researchers - Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and, of course, Osama bin Laden, as well as lesser-known (but no less significant) figures like Yemeni cleric Abd al-Majid al-Zindani - Johnsen weaves a fine narrative of the importance of the Afghan War to the Arab World, and, specifically, the Yemen, of the 1980s. Additionally, he provides a primer on the development of Osama bin Laden's violent ideology, an offshoot (and significant expansion) of his mentor Azzam's theory that violent jihad in defense of Muslim territory was fard al-ayn (الفرض العين) - an individual duty incumbent on all Muslims.
Equally important to the tale of al-Qaeda in Yemen is bin Laden's post-Afghanistan development of his terrorist organization and the progressive expansion of his ideology from merely battling "non-Islamic" intruders in the Arab world, to attacking the "apostate" governments aligned with the United States; from attacking U.S. interests in the region, to attacking American civilians (regardless of their gender, age, or military/civilian status) in the heart of the United States. Bin Laden had little interest in the United States until the first Gulf War, when, with the acquiescence of the al-Saud monarchy, American troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of the American-led military campaign to expel Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait. Indeed, as Johnsen describes, bin Laden's first post-Afghanistan plot involved jihad against the communist government of what was then South Yemen, directly to the south of bin Laden's home country of Saudi Arabia:
"In the months after Azzam's assassination [e.g. late 1989/early 1990], bin Laden and Fadhli [e.g. Tariq al-Fadhli, a veteran of bin Laden's cadre of "Arab Afghans"] sat up late in the evening . . . as they sketched out the future of jihad in bin Laden's apartment. They were both drawn to Yemen, the land of their father . . . . Said to be the Arab world's Afghanistan, Yemen was full of tribes and mountains, and, at least in the south, was ruled by Socialists. But mostly it was a blank map onto which the two young jihadis could project their ambitions." (Pgs. 17-18)While America's so-called "occupation" of the "Land of the Two Holy Places" quickly turned bin Laden's attention away from Yemen back to Saudi Arabia and beyond the sea to the United States, the seeds of the al-Qaeda organization he had planted in Yemen, with Tariq al-Fadhli as his regional lieutenant, would continue to grow.
And it is precisely here that we find the crux of Johnsen's story: the growth, decimation, and resurrection of al-Qaeda in Yemen. With a few exceptions (events like the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and names like Anwar al-Awlaki), this story is an unfamiliar one. But it is a fascinating and incredibly informative tale - a tale that should be required reading for anyone interested in al-Qaeda, the War on Terror, or counter-terrorism studies generally. Johnsen details how Yemen's internal politics allowed al-Qaeda to grow and thrive during the early 1990s, as Ali Abdullah Saleh (the President of North Yemen who had recently overseen Yemen's unification with his Southern counterpart, Ali Salim al-Bid) twice allied with Tariq al-Fadhli, bin Laden's lieutenant, in order to strengthen his own power in relation to his rivals in southern Yemen. As Johnsen writes,
"Fadhli was loyal to bin Laden and the plan they had made together, but he was also bound to his father's tribe and their lands in the south. . . . . But for the moment, at least, Fadhli didn't have to choose. In the early 1990s, Salih and the jihadists were on the same side." (Pg. 22)But, for Yemen's al-Qaeda branch, all good things had to come to an end. While facing some internal difficulties during the mid and late '90s, with the turn of the century and the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole in October 2000 and the Twin Towers and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda in Yemen's grace period was over: the group was then firmly in the crosshairs of the United States. Johnsen's depiction of the diplomatic back-and-forth between the US and Salih in the aftermath of 9/11, and the two allies' eventual destruction of al-Qaeda's Yemeni-based operations structure is a fascinating, and the final reversal of America and Yemen's initial success - the rebirth of al-Qaeda in Yemen as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula under the leadership of Islamists like Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Said Ali al-Shihri, and Anwar Awlaki - chilling in its implications.
Perhaps just as interesting as Johnsen's overarching history of al-Qaeda in Yemen is a comparatively brief interlude in the book's fourth chapter, "Faith and Wisdom," describing the tribulations of Ayman al-Zawahiri's terrorist organization, al-Jihad (aka Egyptian Islamic Jihad), during the mid-1990s and the open revolt of many of the organization's members in the wake of Zawahiri's decision to align al-Jihad with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda in 1998. As Johnsen writes,
"Along with several other terrorist leaders, Zawahiri and bin Laden issued a fatwa entitled 'Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.' The declaration of war urged 'every Muslim' to kill Americans and Jews wherever they found them. Zawahiri's followers in Yemen were stunned. They hadn't been consulted. What was their boss doing? Criticism poured in from around the Middle East, Africa, and Europe as members of al-Jihad struggled to come to terms with Zawahiri's about-face. They were supposed to be fighting Mubarak's regime, and now Zawahiri wanted them to kill Americans.I found this particularly interesting simply because I was unaware that the alliance between bin Laden and Zawahiri resulted in such discord within the jihadi community.
. . . Convinced their leader had lost touch, al-Jihad operatives around the world started announcing their resignation." (Pg. 52-53)
Anyway, to wrap it up, I would highly recommend The Last Refuge to anyone interested in counter-terrorism or security studies, Yemen, al-Qaeda, or the Middle East in general. It is an excellent read, and well worth your time and money.
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