Why is the al-Nusra Front So Powerful/Important?
The al-Nusra Front is powerful and important for several reasons. First, to put things very bluntly, al-Nusra is powerful because it's good at what it does. While it is a fairly new group (having only been formed in January of this year), it is, as has been elaborated in one of my earlier posts, responsible for some of the most significant attacks against the Assad regime and the Syrian Army that have occurred since the beginning of the Syrian uprising. In total, the group has claimed credit for over six hundred (600) attacks over the past year.
In addition to the group's sheer ferocity and the frequency/scale of its attacks, the al-Nusra Front is also significant due to its jihadist connections and its association with al-Qaeda. The group has been described as the "next big al-Qaida franchise," and it is thought to be an offshoot of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) - the umbrella organization of Iraqi terror/insurgent groups that includes al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Indeed, al-Nusra's connections to AQI proved to be one of the main justifications provided by the US State Department when it blacklisted the al-Nusra Front as a "foreign terrorist organization" in early December 2012. The State Department press release stated that while "al-Nusrah has sought to portray itself as part of the legitimate Syrian opposition," its attacks are, instead, "an attempt by AQI to hijack the struggles of the Syrian people for its own malign purposes."
Al-Nusra's connection to AQI and the ISI provides the group with a distinct advantage over other Syrian factions in terms of expertise, experience, and foreign resources. Additionally, as Aaron Zelin has written in Foreign Policy, the al-Nusra Front benefits from its al-Qaeda connections through its access to online jihadi media forums:
Like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas before it, the al-Nusra Front has already begun to employ this tactic, taking over important agricultural and energy operations in Deir Ezzor (Dayr al-Zawr) and the nearby city of Abu Kamal. As Hassan Hassan writes (again in Foreign Policy), the al-Nusra Front is "perceived to be more disciplined and concerned with local communities' needs" than its secular counter-parts in the Syrian opposition, and the group has taken it upon itself to provide security for local businesses, affordable fuel distribution, and a host of other relief services. Many Syrians, Hassan writes, "are drawn to the group by virtue of its effectiveness in fighting the regime and delivering public services." The more firmly entrenched the al-Nusra Front becomes in the areas under its control, and the more public goodwill the group can accrue through its dispensation of social services, the more difficult it will be for more moderate, secular factions of the Syrian opposition to uproot it after the Syrian conflict has concluded.
Al-Nusra's connection to AQI and the ISI provides the group with a distinct advantage over other Syrian factions in terms of expertise, experience, and foreign resources. Additionally, as Aaron Zelin has written in Foreign Policy, the al-Nusra Front benefits from its al-Qaeda connections through its access to online jihadi media forums:
"Jabhat al-Nusra is also plugged into al Qaeda's transnational online media echo system. Its official media outlet, al-Manara al-Bayda ("the White Minaret"), maintains ties with al Qaeda's web forums Shamukh al-Islam and al-Fida' al-Islam. On Shamukh, there is even a dedicated section for Jabhat al-Nusra's releases -- a status only shared with the ISI."This access provides al-Nusra with a ready audience of jihadi/Islamist sympathizers to whom it publishes its statements and videos, some of which are fairly well-edited and heavily produced. It also provides a platform for glossy "terrorist-training-camp-fun-time!" photos like these:
Finally, in addition to the frequency/ferocity of its attacks, its connections to al-Qaeda, and its . . . slick(?) . . . online advertising, the al-Nusra Front is important because it seems to be employing a strategy that other Islamist groups have used to significant affect in other areas of the Arab world. This strategy is to use the provision of social services to bolster the group's prestige and to ingratiate it to the local community in the areas under its control.
Like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas before it, the al-Nusra Front has already begun to employ this tactic, taking over important agricultural and energy operations in Deir Ezzor (Dayr al-Zawr) and the nearby city of Abu Kamal. As Hassan Hassan writes (again in Foreign Policy), the al-Nusra Front is "perceived to be more disciplined and concerned with local communities' needs" than its secular counter-parts in the Syrian opposition, and the group has taken it upon itself to provide security for local businesses, affordable fuel distribution, and a host of other relief services. Many Syrians, Hassan writes, "are drawn to the group by virtue of its effectiveness in fighting the regime and delivering public services." The more firmly entrenched the al-Nusra Front becomes in the areas under its control, and the more public goodwill the group can accrue through its dispensation of social services, the more difficult it will be for more moderate, secular factions of the Syrian opposition to uproot it after the Syrian conflict has concluded.
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