Wednesday, January 30, 2013

Torture and Art in Wars on Terror: Epilogue

I wrote in my initial post that I wasn't going to go on a long-winded tirade about "how torture is wrong."  And I feel like I held myself to that pretty well.  But, now that that's done, it's time to rant, because during my research (*cough* reading Twitter and online news *cough*) for this series of blog posts, I came across a Tweet that I think perfectly exemplifies one of the most significant moral problems that arises from ZD30.


My first response upon reading this tweet was to do the most epic Picard Facepalm since the good Captain immortalized that time-honored technique.  My second was to immediately screenshot the damn thing, because surely the author would realize the all-kinds-of-stupid nonsense she/he had just written and try and delete the evidence as quickly as possible.  In this, however, I was wrong... the tweet is currently still online; even after some more charitable tweeps corrected this person's misperception, she/he maintained that waterboarding didn't look much like torture compared to "the stuff you see in real movies." Again, cue Captain Picard.

But then I had a terrible realization.  Contrary to my initial perception, this tweet (while still pretty stupid) might not be all that unsurprising for two reasons: 1) many individuals, and even some who still wield political power in the United States government, continue to parse a distinction between "enhanced interrogation" and torture; and 2) many individuals know about waterboarding on a theoretical level, but they don't fully understand what it is or what its effects are.

Source: "Torture on Trial," Link TV Documentary
This probably is not helped by the oft-repeated explanation that waterboarding merely "simulates the sensation of drowning."  To say that the technique simply "simulates" this terrifying sensation gives the impression that there is really no danger to the individual being waterboarded - in the same sense as, say, a paintball game "simulates" the sensation of being in a gun-battle with none of the attendant risks of serious injury or death.  This makes waterboarding out to be more of a ruse or a trick than a torture technique.  The reality is much grimmer.  As the late Christopher Hitchens - who allowed himself to be waterboarded for a Vanity Fair story - described it: "You feel that you are drowning because you are drowning — or, rather, being drowned, albeit slowly and under controlled conditions and at the mercy (or otherwise) of those who are applying the pressure."  Feel free to watch Mr. Hitchens being waterboarded; the footage is on YouTube.  See how long he lasts, and how very little water it takes for a man to break.

Many reviews of Zero Dark Thirty have lauded the fact that Bigelow pulled no punches in the scenes depicting the United States' "enhanced interrogation" practices.  It is impossible to view the movie, these reviewers insist, without being able to understand that the waterboarding, sexual humiliation, physical restraint, beatings, stress positions, and other practices shown are clearly acts of torture.  To a large extent, I agree with this analysis.  I know that I found those scenes to be difficult to watch, and the film's opening interrogation sequence chilled me, a feeling that I was unable to shake throughout the entire movie.  Most horrible of all was the scene in which Ammar, sexually humiliated ("You don't mind if my female colleague sees your junk?") and left alone with Maya, begs her to help him.  Her cold response, "You can help yourself by being truthful," and the fear and pain in his puffy, sleep-deprived eyes made me disgusted and ashamed.  Perhaps it was meant to.  As the reviewers I've cited note, it certainly seems hard to imagine that anyone could watch these scenes and not believe that what they were seeing was torture.

And yet . . .  And yet I wonder.  Because it is still hard for me to imagine that, over a decade after the waterboarding/"enhanced interrogation" debate began, anyone could have written the Tweet I posted above.  And I see the rave reviews that people have given Zero Dark Thirty, the "hooah!" audience response, the thrilled Tweets of "best movie ever, OMG!!! <3", and the gleeful "I-told-you-sos" in some quarters that yes, of course, enhanced interrogation made the difference in the hunt for bin Laden - and, again, I wonder.

Because there's that statement, lingering on the tweetdeck of our unfortunate Tweep subject, above: that what was portrayed in Zero Dark Thirty "didn't look much like torture compared to the stuff you see in real movies."  I wonder how many of the film's viewers agree with that statement.  Because, at some level, it's true, isn't it?  Nothing in ZD30 seems quite as brutal as James Bond getting his testicles pounded on with a length of rope in Casino Royale.  No detainees' body parts are cut off, there are no mock executions, and there are no forms of penetrative torture (e.g. gunshots, stabbing, etc.) à la 24.  Nobody is tortured via electric shock, as Liam Neeson tortures his daughter's kidnapper in Taken.  Are these the only kinds of things that rise to the level of "real" torture?  Certainly not.  As the great anti-Soviet novelist and crusader Aleksander Solzhenitsyn wrote in the first volume of his expansive Gulag Archipelago, even such a seemingly mundane thing as sleep deprivation - one of the comparatively "lighter" forms of "enhanced interrogation" that the viewer witnesses in Zero Dark Thirty - can be an extremely potent form of torture:
"Sleeplessness (yes, combined with standing, thirst, bright light, terror, and the unknown — what other tortures are needed!?) befogs the reason, undermines the will, and the human being ceases to be himself, to be his own "I." . . . .

. . . . Here is how one victim . . . describes his feelings after this torture [e.g. sleep deprivation]: ". . . . Irises of the eyes dried out as if someone were holding a red-hot iron in front of them. Tongue swollen from thirst and prickling as from a hedgehog at the slightest movement. Throat racked by spasms of swallowing."

Sleeplessness was a great form of torture: it left no visible marks and could not provide grounds for complaint even if an inspection — something unheard of anyway — were to strike on the morrow.

'They didn't let you sleep? Well, after all, this is not supposed to be a vacation resort. The Security officials were awake too!'" (The Gulag Archipelago: 1918 - 1956 Vol. 1, pg. 112)
But . . . it doesn't look like the torture you see in "real" movies.  It doesn't seem as brutal as the cinematic depictions of torture I've described above.  And, after all, we got bin Laden . . . .

How many people, then, are willing to view the torture scenes in Zero Dark Thirty and think to themselves, like Solzhenitsyn's imaginary NKVD agent (the NKVD preceded the KGB as the Soviet Union's secret police force), "they didn't let you sleep and played loud music?  Well, this isn't supposed to be a vacation resort!"  "Oh, they stuffed you in a box?  But, after all, you are a Very Bad Person and, really, it's not SUCH a terrible thing."  "Sure, you were put in a collar and paraded about half-naked like a dog, but it's not like we subjected you to Real Torture™like you see in the movies."

Compounding the effects of these sorts of justifications is the fact that all of the detainees who are tortured in Zero Dark Thirty are portrayed as being connected, in one way or another, to al-Qaeda.  This brings to mind another Solzhenitsyn reference: the chilling title to his book We Never Make Mistakes.  It is comparatively easy to justify torture in the world of Zero Dark Thirty, where the tactic not only works, but is only ever employed against people who we know, 100%, to be actual terrorists.  In the real world, however, everyone - even, and perhaps especially, US intelligence - makes mistakes.  Not everyone who was interrogated during the "enhanced interrogation" program was guilty, either by association or otherwise; indeed, some unfortunate, innocent people paid the ultimate price as a result of their mistaken arrest and "interrogation" by the United States.

This is not to denigrate the ultimate conclusion of Zero Dark Thirty.  I certainly believe that bin Laden got what was coming to him, and for those who want to dismiss the SEAL raid that killed him as a mere "assassination" I have nothing but contempt.  But at what moral cost was this great victory obtained?  Zero Dark Thirty, as we've seen over the course of the past few blog posts, certainly doesn't examine this question in any meaningful way.  Instead, it provides an action movie apologia for torture that at least some people (those who don't view the "enhanced interrogation" methods as rising to the level of Real Torture) seem to be interpreting as, "what we did wasn't so bad . . . and it worked!"  The vocal, visceral positive responses to the film that I've seen both online and in person (my entire theater applauded at the end of the movie; I'm willing to bet cash money that yours did, too) seem to indicate that, whatever the moral cost of torture might be, it's a cost that by the end of the film most, or, at least, many, are willing to bear.

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Torture and Art in Wars on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of "Zero Dark Thirty" and "The Battle of Algiers" (Part 3 - Zero Dark Thirty)

And now, ladies and gentlemen, we come to the finale of our examination, although, ironically, the subject is the basis of our whole discussion.  Having discussed the depiction of torture in The Battle of Algiers, we finally turn to Zero Dark Thirty.  Given my thesis that The Battle of Algiers succeeds in portraying terror in a nuanced way and that ZD30 does not, we now have to compare the two movies to determine where, exactly, the difference lies.

Let me start out by acknowledging that ZD30 is very good movie.  Katheryn Bigelow is an exceptional director, and the Oscar she won for The Hurt Locker was well deserved.  ZD30 is yet more evidence (as if any were needed) of her skills: the film is slick, well-paced, and many of its shots are downright beautiful.  And, of course, the climactic storming of bin Laden's Abbottabad compound was a cinematic thrill unlike any that is likely to be seen on the silver screen for some time.

But the aspects of the film that some people have claimed gives the movie the moral complexity to be a masterpiece - specifically, its focus on "enhanced interrogation" and its obvious message that torture provided the leads that led to Osama bin Laden's killing - in my mind, at least, do precisely the opposite.  If the use and depiction of torture in The Battle of Algiers provides an example of a film that treats torture in both a morally and situationally complex way, the depiction of torture in ZD30 provides merely an illusion complexity.

As an initial matter, for the purpose of this analysis let us begin by crediting (whether we believe them or not) three of the core presumptions that ZD30 seems to make:
  • First, that none of the detainees who are tortured in the course of the "enhanced interrogation" program are innocent - all are, in some way or another, connected to al-Qaeda
  • Second, that torture is effective - it results in accurate, actionable intelligence
  • Third, that, more specifically, torture was essential to the discovery and elimination of Osama bin Laden himself
OK.  So . . . if we credit these points, we, the viewers, are left in roughly the same situation in which we found ourselves at the beginning of The Battle of Algiers.  Torture works, and torture helps you succeed.  So what is it that makes the movies so utterly different?

Failure to Seriously Examine Torture-as-Tactic:
I'll begin with an observation based more on artistic style and story-telling than anything else.  As I noted in the previous post, The Battle of Algiers provides the viewer with the movie's (quasi) outcome at the beginning of the film: the French eliminate the FLN and "win" the Battle of Algiers.  The rest of the film is a deeper, darker journey through the struggle between the FLN and the French - the roots of the FLN's urban guerilla campaign, the atrocities committed by both sides, the strikes, the press conferences, the torture, the systematic elimination of the FLN's executive bureau.  And then, at the very end, we have the historical version of the classic "twist" ending: despite Colonel Mathieu and his troops' destruction of the FLN's organization, the Algerian people rise up and France eventually has to abandon its former colony.  The entire movie, then, is not only an attempt to understand the complexity of the conflict in the city Algiers; it is, itself, an explanation for the eventual failure of France's colonial venture in Algeria.

Contrast this with ZD30, which is not, and, granted, is not meant to be, an overarching examination of the United States' War on Terror.  ZD30 is, above all else, a detective story and thriller.  Thus, it follows the typical detective story/thriller plot layout: a crime is committed (9/11); which sets in motion an investigation; which results in leads/clues, but also leads to obstacles; these obstacles are overcome, and the leads/clues are used to solve the crime or capture the criminal. Or, in this case, kill the criminal. In this kind of set-up, there is no reflection.  There is only forward momentum.  Whereas torture in The Battle of Algiers was both a device for propelling the plot and a central moral theme, torture in ZD30 is simply the former: it's the tool that gets the leads, sets further detective work in motion, and, eventually, results in the killing of bin Laden.

Worse still, torture is not merely a tool: it is an unexamined one.  ZD30 contains none of the back-story or explanation that makes up a significant portion of The Battle of Algiers.  ZD30's CIA personnel never really discuss torture - no justification is given for its use, no defense of the tactic is employed, indeed, its use and efficacy are never questioned by anybody.

Now, one could argue that, surely, the film's brief opening scene (a blank screen with real, heartbreaking audio from 9/11 emergency calls playing in the background) provides the justification for the torture we see committed by the CIA seconds later.  But I find this argument unpersuasive.  The 9/11 attacks were terrible.  But so was Pearl Harbor.  So was every battle during World War II (and many of these battles involved death tolls far in excess of 9/11).  I can understand the visceral terror and shock of watching as the heart of America was attacked on national television - hell, I remember it, I was there watching with everyone else.  But tell me this: have you ever seen a World War II film (that is, one that's not directed by Quentin Tarantino) in which American troops make a habit of torturing Nazi or Japanese prisoners?  I can't think of a single WWII film in which American troops are portrayed as torturers, much less one in which atrocities or violence by America's enemies was used as a justification for widespread torture.  What is it that makes the 9/11 attacks so different that ZD30 can take the US from Ground Zero to torture in the span of about two minutes?

I'll grant the possibility that Bigelow's juxtaposition of 9/11 and torture at the beginning of the movie was artistic, perhaps meant to symbolize the panicked and unreflective speed with which the Bush Administration instituted the "enhanced interrogation" program.  But given the ultimate trajectory of the film and its overwhelmingly positive portrayal of torture (see above and below), I can't say that this artistic choice was successful, if, indeed, it was intended at all.  And so the viewer is left with torture that simply is.  There is no explanation for it; no justification for it.  Why did we do it - was it out of malice (revenge), fear, an honest belief that it was the only way we could present future attacks?  The movie comes closest to endorsing the third possibility - or, at least, that's my interpretation of Bigelow's continuous use of depictions of real-life terrorist attacks (the London 7/7 bombings, the Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing, the Camp Chapman suicide attack, and the attempted bombing of New York's Times Square) to punctuate the plot at various points in the movie.  But we don't know, because, throughout, the use of torture is simply unexamined.

Lack of Moral Complexity:
ZD30's failure to seriously examine the roots of torture in the aftermath of 9/11 leads to my second point: unlike many of the critics who have lauded ZD30 for its "brave" and "honest" portrayal of torture, I would disagree with the proposition that the movie is morally complex.  It isn't.  While you could argue this point at some theoretical level, reading into the movie's so-called "subtext," the film itself is unequivocally pro-torture.  In fact, to the extent that it is mentioned or recognized at all, nearly every reference to "enhanced interrogation" in the movie is laudatory: as Noah Millman writes in a mostly positive review of the film for "The American Conservative,"
"Down the line, top to bottom, nobody ever says anything critical about the torture of prisoners. Multiple times, after torture ceases, CIA officers complain that they can’t get good information anymore now that they can’t torture suspects. Nobody contradicts them."
And so it is.  The only negative things said about torture in the film come not from any moral or philosophical opposition to the tactic, but, much more practically, from political considerations. At one point in the film, Dan, the CIA operative who acts as ZD30's torturer-in-chief (ironically, also my favorite character... though for entirely different reasons), tells Maya that the political winds are changing and that she ought to consider getting out of the torture business because she won't "want to be the last one holding a dog-collar."  In another scene, of a strategy session between Maya and two of her CIA colleagues, a television in the background is playing a speech by President Obama decrying the use of torture and issuing an executive order halting the "enhanced interrogation" program.  The looks on the faces of Maya and her colleagues are completely non-plussed.  They may as well have rolled their eyes.  "Of course those politicians would be saying such things," they seem to think, "but us, here on the ground? We know better."

I'll end this section with a block-quote from Rolling Stone's Matt Taibbi.  Although he is writer with whom I frequently disagree, and vociferously, he pretty much nailed his review of ZD30 (ominously entitled "Zero Dark Thirty Is Osama bin Laden's Last Victory Over America"), in which he writes,
"Bigelow put [torture] in, which was "honest," but it seems an eerie coincidence that she was "honest" about torture in pretty much exactly the way a CIA interrogator would have told the story, without including much else.

There's no way to watch Zero Dark Thirty without seeing it as a movie about how torture helped us catch Osama bin Laden. . . . . This was definitely not a movie about two vicious and murderous groups of people killing and torturing each other in an endless cycle of increasingly brainless revenge. And this was not a movie about how America lost its values en route to a great strategic victory. No, this was a straight-up "hero catches bad guys" movie, and the idea that audiences weren't supposed to identify with Maya the torturer is ludicrous."
This is absolutely correct.

Grand Scale (or "Second-Tier") Consequences:
My final critique in this comparison of ZD30 with The Battle of Algiers lies in the realm of what I'll call "second-tier consequences."  In my mind, the term "first-tier consequences" would describe the negative consequences that occur during or as an immediate result of torture - for instance, the moral degradation of the torturer; the risk of torturing an innocent person or one who does not have/know the information the torturer is seeking; the obtaining of false or exaggerated intelligence, given simply to make the torture stop; and similar problems.  Note that, because we have accepted ZD30's presumptions about torture - that it works, that it produces useful and actionable intelligence, and that none of its victims are actually innocent - we have wholly eliminated a discussion of the "first-tier consequences" that would obviously be integral to any analysis of the real-life "enhanced interrogation" program.

But the "second-tier consequences"?  Whole different ballgame.  These are the negative secondary effects of torture: the loss of stature and support for the United States among its allies, the cementing of the US image as "oppressor" to those already predisposed to think of it as such, the domestic horror and subsequent decline in public support for America's international actions.  And it is in this realm that ZD30 truly falls short.

Sure, in ZD30-land torture helped Maya and the CIA find and kill bin Laden.  But this is a cause-and-effect relationship that occurs only in the film's detective/manhunt/thriller vacuum.  In the movie's single-minded focus on Maya's hunt for bin Laden, nobody - not Bigelow, not Maya, not any other character - mentions or even considers the effects that torture might have in the wider world.  Which, in the context of a global War on Terrorism, is actually pretty freaking important.

Recall, as we saw in my last blog post, that the French military's use of torture in The Battle of Algiers resulted in a deeper level of alienation among the Algerian populace and a marked increase in their anti-French and anti-colonial sentiments.  Eventually, the film insinuates, it was these factors, bubbling to the surface in widespread public demonstration, and not the FLN's bombs and assassinations that doomed France's colonial control over Algeria.

As those of us who live in the real world know from painful experience, the United States and its interests around the world have suffered less dramatic, but by no means unimportant, repercussions as a result of the "enhanced interrogation" program.  The infamous images of torture at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison decimated the United States' image as Iraq's liberator, poured fuel on the flames of the growing Iraqi insurgency, and jilted the American public's support for the war.  Reports of prisoner abuse and Qur'an desecration at Guantanamo resulted in deadly riots in Afghanistan and in other locations around the Arab World.  And with each report of torture in Iraq, in Afghanistan, at Guantanamo, or at some secret CIA black site, more American stature was lost and the United States' insistence that it merely sought to bring freedom and democracy to the world rang more hollow.  There is a quote in the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Handbook (circa 2007):
"Any human rights abuses or legal violations committed by U.S. forces quickly become known throughout the local populace and eventually around the world. Illegitimate actions undermine both long- and short-term COIN [counter-insurgency] efforts."
Talk about an understatement.

But just as ZD30 fails to examine any other aspect of torture, so, too, does it fail to examine torture's second-tier consequences.  Iraq is never mentioned.  Global public opinion is never mentioned.  The Muslim world's opinion of the United States is never mentioned.  Neither Maya nor any of her CIA superiors seem to consider or care about whether their efforts are really the best strategy for eliminating global terror - whether they are really effectively preventing attacks and knocking off terrorists, or are merely nurturing the resentments that will lead to greater anti-American sentiment, strengthen radical Islamists, and result in yet more terror.

It is questions like that that a serious, nuanced examination of torture would have produced, and it is questions like that which fall by the wayside in the heady, heart-thumping adrenaline rush of the film's ending.  Because, hey, they got bin Laden.

Monday, January 21, 2013

Torture & Art in Wars on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of "Zero Dark Thirty" and "The Battle of Algiers" (Part 2 - Battle of Algiers)

"The basis of our job is intelligence. The method: interrogation. Conducted in such a way to ensure that we always get an answer. In our situation, false humanitarian considerations can only lead to despair and confusion. I am certain that all units will understand and react accordingly."
                                                                         -
Colonel Mathieu, The Battle of Algiers 
Alright, folks, we are back again for the second post in our multi-part comparison of artistic depictions of torture in Zero Dark Thirty (ZD30) and The Battle of Algiers.  This post will focus on the latter of the two films, while a discussion of ZD30 itself will largely be reserved for the next post.

Why The Battle of Algiers?
Perhaps the first question that should be asked and answered is, "why are we comparing ZD30 to The Battle of Algiers, rather than, say, 24, Homeland, or some other more modern cinematic allegory or depiction of the War on Terror?"

There are two main reasons that I selected The Battle of Algiers as the subject of this comparative analysis.  The first is fairly straightforward: unlike most of the post-9/11 films/television programs that depict or allegorize the War on Terror, The Battle of Algiers is, like ZD30, a fictionalized representation of real events.  Where ZD30 tells the story of the United States' 10-year hunt for Osama bin Laden after the September 11 terrorist attacks (which the movie bills as the "Greatest Manhunt in History"), The Battle of Algiers depicts one of the pivotal moments in the Algerian War: the titular Battle of Algiers, in which urban guerillas aligned with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) engaged in a protracted campaign of bombings and shootings against French interests in the Algerian capitol.  In response, the French dispatched General Jacques Massu and a division of French paratroopers, who restored order in the restive city through a heavy-handed campaign of coercive interrogations and torture.

And therein lies the second reason for my selection of The Battle of Algiers.  For all their differences - and, indeed, the differences between the films (to say nothing of the real-world situations that inspired them) are profound - ZD30 and The Battle of Algiers share a number of significant similarities: both concern Western nations battling terrorism and the dark extremes that even "civilized" nations will go to protect their perceived interests or accomplish their goals.  Both depict the regional environments in which the respective Western militaries or intelligence agencies must work.  Both acknowledge and depict - although with stark differences with respect to the level of sympathy induced in the viewer - the terrorist actions against which the Western nations are fighting.  And, most importantly for our purposes, the plot lines of both films are intricately bound up with the question of torture.  Indeed, this questionable theme is so significant that both ZD30 and The Battle of Algiers open with scenes involving torture.

(NOTE: for those unfamiliar with The Battle of Algiers, the entire film can currently be viewed on YouTube, although I'd get on that, since it could probably be taken down at any time as a copyright violation)

The Depiction of Torture in The Battle of Algiers:
And now we get to the meat of the matter: the depiction of torture in the The Battle of Algiers and the central role it plays in the film.

As in ZD30, the viewer know what he is getting into as soon as the movie begins: a half-naked man, beaten and dejected, sits in a French interrogation room, as a soldier speaks the film's chilling opening line, "Why couldn't you have talked sooner?  It would have gone easier for you."  The man, who is revealed to have a large burn covering the entire left part of his chest, is then pressed into a French military uniform and brought into the Casbah - the city's largest Arab quarter - to finger the location of the fighter he has given up: Ali La Pointe, the last free FLN member in the city of Algiers.

Street in Algiers' Casbah
Source: Wikimedia Commons
Notice then, what is conveyed even within the first several minutes of The Battle of Algiers: torture has not only been routinized by the French in their battle against the FLN, but, much more significantly, it is effective.  So effective, in fact, that Colonel Mathieu (a composite character representing General Massu and other French military leaders in Algeria) and his men have broken the back of the FLN's organization in Algiers.  La Pointe, betrayed by the man in the film's opening scene and trapped in his hiding place behind a false wall in an apartment bathroom, is the last loose end for the French to tie up. With his death, the French victory in the Battle of Algiers is assured.

Thus, the first several minutes of the film can be summarized in three steps: 1) Western nation tortures in pursuit of its goal; 2) this torture is effective and results in concrete leads; and 3) Western nation is able to follow these leads to achieve its goal.  To boomerang away from the Battle of Algiers for a moment, I will note that this three-step formula is, to a significant degree, a one-sentence plot summary of Zero Dark Thirty - although, admittedly, with two hours of well-developed, well-paced, and interesting detective work (punctuated by repeated al-Qaeda attacks) thrown in for good measure.

But few (decent) movies are willing to give their game away in the first few minutes, and The Battle of Algiers is no exception: the three-step formula described above may be a useful vantage point from which to view the movie's events, but it is merely the surface level of a much deeper - and much more morally convoluted - whole.  Unlike ZD30, which depicts torture as something that simply is, The Battle of Algiers provides the viewer with a much broader picture of torture.  The film examines the spiral of violence between the FLN and the French colonial police/military that led to the tactic's adoption; the physical brutality of the torture methods employed; the justifications offered by the French military; and, perhaps most importantly, the effects of the tactic on the local population and its ultimate failure to save the French colonial venture in Algeria.  This is a nuanced treatment of the question of torture in cinema, and, in the next blog post, I intend to show why ZD30 fails to live up to this thought-provoking standard.

For now, however, let us continue our examination of The Battle of Algiers.  What does the movie do right?

1) Well, for one thing, the film actually talks about torture and refuses to present the tactic as a mere fait accompli or to treat it merely as a very big and very obvious elephant in the room.  As the movie shows, the French police in Algeria were not originally in the torture business: while the police, frustrated at their inability to prevent their own officers from being gunned down by FLN assassins, certainly engaged in some despicable, extralegal tactics (the bombing of a suspected FLN member's family home, for instance) in their attempts to get FLN violence under control, torture was not among them.  However, after a series of FLN bombs kill dozens of French Algerians in near-simultaneous explosions at a restaurant, dance club, and airline ticket counter, the French substantially up their game.  Colonel Mathieu and his paratroopers are deployed to Algiers with orders to crush the FLN.  And so it is that, shortly after their arrival, the viewer is treated to this speech from Colonel Mathieu, briefing his troops on the enemy that they are charged with destroying - a speech that, if disconnected from Algeria's FLN and applied to al-Qaeda and the broader Muslim world, could easily have been given by an American military commander in the years after 9/11:
"There are 400,000 Arabs in Algiers. Are they all our enemies? We know they are not. But a small minority holds sway by means of terror and violence. We must deal with this minority in order to isolate and destroy it. It's a dangerous enemy that works in the open and underground . . . . It's a faceless enemy, unrecognizable, blending in with hundreds of others. . . . . Among all these Arab men and women are the [terrorists]. But who are they? How can we recognize them?" (NOTE: see YouTube film at 55:38 for footage)
Having explained the overarching problem that his troops will face - the problem of determining who is and is not an enemy in a native population of hundreds of thousands of individuals - Colonel Mathieu elaborates their second predicament: the FLN is structured in such a way that its members are insulated from one another.  Each member of the organization knows only three others: the higher-up that recruited that member, and two underling that that member himself recruited. In order to crack the FLN, the French paratroopers must break through this defense by working their way up the chain, eliminating the organization's "triangle" sections one by one until they reach the top: the military head of the FLN.  And how will they do this?  Colonel Mathieu has the answer: the use of what the CIA would later call "enhanced interrogation techniques" to "convince" captured FLN members to finger their immediate superiors in the organization.
"The basis of our job is intelligence. The method: interrogation. Conducted in such a way to ensure that we always get an answer. In our situation, false humanitarian considerations can only lead to despair and confusion. I am certain that all units will understand and react accordingly."
And his paratroopers do understand.  They react accordingly.  And, as the beginning of the movie shows, their tactics meet with resounding success.  But, as the video clip below (depicting a press conference between Mathieu and members of the French-Algerian media) shows, questions remain:


Colonel Mathieu is insistent that the success his troop have achieved is directly related to the tactics they have employed, and he gives the very post-9/11 dismissal to his journalist critics that, "The word 'torture' isn't used in our orders."  He goes on to detail the FLN's strategy of requiring captured members to stay silent for 24 hours after their capture so as to give the organization time to make any information they then give to French authorities useless.  "What form of questioning must we adopt [to combat these tactics?]" Mathieu asks incredulously, "Civil law procedures that take months for a mere misdemeanor?"  He then presents the assembled journalists with his stark picture of the conflict:
"The problem is this: the FLN wants to throw us out of Algeria, and we want to stay. Even with slight shades of opinion you all agree that we must stay. When the FLN rebellion began, there were no shades at all - every paper, the communist [or left-wing] press included, wanted it crushed. . . . . Therefore, it's my turn to ask a question: should France stay in Algeria? If your answer is still 'yes,' then you must accept all the necessary consequences."
It might not be much - e.g. no reporter seriously challenges the paratroopers' use of torture to put down the FLN - but it's something.  The characters in the movie recognize torture as being a subject of significance, whether from a moral or a tactical standpoint, and they discuss it!  Mathieu offers his justifications for the use of torture during the two scenes I've described, and there is at least a little push-back from the assembled reporters ("Legality can be inconvenient").  But the key point is, again, that the question of torture is recognized and discussed, and the viewer, who has been exposed to the atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict, is, for the moment, left to consider whether the tactic can truly be justified.

2) Secondly, The Battle of Algiers does not shy away from depicting the brutality of torture.  Indeed, the scene that follows the press conference scene shown above demonstrates just what grim "necessary consequences" Mathieu is referencing.  It is in this scene - one of the most harrowing in classic cinema (beginning at 1:35:18 in the full-length YouTube video) - that we see the full brutality of Mathieu's techniques.  And this is not "mere" waterboarding - although two forms of water-torture (forced ingestion of water and repeatedly holding a prisoner's head underwater) are depicted.  No, this goes far beyond that: this is torture with blowtorches; torture by hanging bloodied and beaten hog-tied men from the ceiling; and torture by electrocution.

No artistic depiction of torture can be considered honest if it does not convey the horror and brutality involved in such tactics.  In this sense, both The Battle of Algiers and, as we will see, ZD30 succeed.

3) Most significantly, however, The Battle of Algiers shows the ultimate futility - and, indeed, the counter-productivity - of the French military's use of torture.  The French may have won the Battle of Algiers by killing or imprisoning the entire leadership of the FLN, but a battle is not the war, and France's brutal actions in Algiers resulted in a significant increase in the popularity of anti-colonial and anti-French ideology among the native Algerian population.  Left to metastasize for several (relatively) peaceful years, this anti-colonial sentiment burst back into the open in December 1960, with mass demonstrations in support of an independent Algeria.  This is depicted in the film's final 10 minutes, with the film's finale showing a scene from the last day of the 1960 demonstrations while the narrator states that two years later Algeria achieved its independence.

In other words, torture isn't something that occurs in a vacuum.  While it may - and let's really stress that "may" - be useful for achieving certain goals, its consequences and side effects should not be ignored.  Indeed, as The Battle of Algiers shows, the consequences of torture are far more significant than their limited successes: while it is unclear whether France would have been able to maintain control over Algeria without using torture and other brutal tactics to cripple the FLN, its very use of torture and brutality played a central role in turning the native Algerian population against the French and making France's eventual ejection from northern Africa all but certain.  This is one of the key points of the film, and it is a point that other filmmakers, to say nothing of other governments, ought to take note of.

As we will see in the next post (which will likely take several days or so to write . . . sorry), this point is one that was decidedly lost on Kathryn Bigelow when making Zero Dark Thirty.  Rather than depict the large-scale consequences of torture - a precipitous decline in the United States' popularity in the Arab/Muslim World, a loss of stature among even the US's staunchest allies, and justification for greater radicalization and more terrorist attacks - Bigelow chooses, instead, to depict . . . well . . . NO negative consequences of torture.  Not even such comparatively mundane problems as faulty intelligence are treated in Zero Dark Thirty.

But this is the topic of the next post in this series, and I would hate to rant too much about it now.  Until then, I hope you enjoy the early part of your week and I really do recommend that you take some time, if you have it, to watch The Battle of Algiers.  It is truly an excellent film.

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Torture & Art in Wars on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of "Zero Dark Thirty" and "The Battle of Algiers" (Part 1 - Introduction)

Last night, I finally got around to seeing the movie that has dominated online discussion on Twitter, in various periodicals, and on a good many blogs for the past week and a half - or, indeed, almost month and a half when you count the reviews and articles published in the wake of the movie's limited, December release.  Yes, friends, I have finally taken the time, laid my money down, and watched Kathryn Bigelow's "Zero Dark Thirty."

In the wake of its release, "Zero Dark Thirty" (henceforth ZD30) - the tale of the CIA's ten-year manhunt for Osama bin Laden, culminating in the (spoiler!) May 2011 Navy SEAL raid on bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan - has inspired thousands of words of criticism from journalists, online commentators, Tweeps, bloggers, politicians, and even members of the intelligence community itself.  While each individual commenter has his/her own personal take on the movie and its problems, the common thread between all the criticisms of the movie can be communicated in one word: torture.  

Bigelow's depictions of the Bush Administration's "enhanced interrogation" techniques is brutal, deeply unsettling, and has created more ire from critics and (some) movie-goers than George Lucas's decision to put aliens in the fourth "Indiana Jones" movie. (NOTE: that's an exaggeration - from what I've seen of movie-goers' comments, it's apparent that the Indie aliens were far worse).  In addition to the gallons of journalistic ink spilled criticizing Bigelow's portrayal of torture, three United States Senators (John McCain (R, AZ), Diane Feinstein (D, CA), and Carl Levin (D, MI)) also put their thumbs in a decidedly downward position, writing a public letter to Sony Pictures lambasting the movie as "grossly inaccurate and misleading in its suggestion that torture resulted in information that led to the location of Usama bin Laden."  Senator McCain, a Vietnam war veteran and torture survivor, had especially harsh words for the movie, stating that watching the film made him physically "sick."

Bigelow has responded to her critics by insisting that torture played an undeniable role in the hunt for bin Laden and that, regardless of whether it was the primary intelligence method that led to bin Laden's death, it was something the screenwriters couldn't ignore.  "War, obviously, isn't pretty," she says, "and we were not interested in portraying this military action as free of moral consequences."  She has also stated that she personally finds torture to be "reprehensible," and, in a written statement/article published in the Los Angeles Times, she went on to say:
"Those of us who work in the arts know that depiction is not endorsement. If it was, no artist would be able to paint inhumane practices, no author could write about them, and no filmmaker could delve into the thorny subjects of our time."
Which, of course, is true - as far as it goes.  But, as I watched ZD30, I fully understood the points being made by the movie's critics, and my personal opinion is generally one of agreement: Bigelow's film comes dangerously close to, not legitimizing, not promoting, but . . . sanitizing the "enhanced interrogation" tactics employed by the CIA.  Baptized in the endorphin-drenched victory of a successful hunt and a dead enemy, the torture tactics seen by the viewer in the early parts of the film fade into the background - grim, but necessary, component parts of America's victory.  As the credits roll and the movie theater crowd begins to clap, who, then, remembers the suffering of Ammar earlier in the film?

But my goal here is not to write a long-winded criticism of the film in the "why torture is bad" or "how torture doesn't work" or "why this movie is factually inaccurate" veins (although these points will certainly be discussed or touched on to some extent).  Plenty of people have already done that.  Nor is my purpose to prove that Ms. Bigelow or even the film itself is pro-torture.  No, no.  My goal is to write an even more long-winded critique of ZD30 and its depiction of torture from an artistic/realistic perspective by comparing ZD30 with another film - one of my favorites: The Battle of Algiers.  It is my opinion that defenses of ZD30's torture scenes as being merely "nuanced" or showing "the whole picture" are wrong.  While it can certainly be argued that the film holds an accusatory mirror up to American society in the post-9/11 era (e.g. "look what you have become"), if the film sought to show any deeper perspective on the strategic or moral consequences of torture, it fails miserably.  To put it another way, merely showing American CIA agents torturing captured al-Qaeda members is not particularly deep or nuanced.  And this is what ZD30 does: while there are certainly some stricken looks from ZD30's main character, Maya, during the early torture scenes, no one challenges the enhanced interrogation techniques, no discussion takes place about why they are - or even could be - bad/immoral/ineffective, and no negative results arise from their use in the course of the movie.  Even this brief scene from the Batman movie The Dark Knight (on the topic of surveillance) is more nuanced than the treatment of torture in ZD30:


And this is where The Battle of Algiers comes in.  I believe that, unlike ZD30, the Battle of Algiers actually succeeds in examining the issues involved in a Western nation's fight against terrorism - whether employed for nationalist or trans-nationalist purposes - from a nuanced perspective that actually allows the viewer to think more deeply about these issues.  And, over a series of posts that examines what each movie did right and what each movie did wrong when it comes to artistic portrayals of torture, I hope to show why.  We will begin (hopefully soon) with a post about The Battle of Algiers, with a background primer on that film and an examination of its treatment of torture within the context of the French-Algerian conflict.

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

On Syrian Chemical Weapons

Perhaps the biggest news of the day is Josh Rogin's bombshell-ish report in Foreign Policy's "The Cable" that the US State Department believes chemical weapons have been used by the Assad regime.  The weapons were allegedly deployed, as originally reported by al-Jazeera, against rebel/opposition forces in the city of Homs on December 23, 2012.

As Mr. Rogin reports:
A secret State Department cable has concluded that the Syrian military likely used chemical weapons against its own people in a deadly attack last month . . .

United States diplomats in Turkey conducted a previously undisclosed, intensive investigation into claims that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons, and made what an Obama administration official who reviewed the cable called a "compelling case" that Assad's military forces had used a deadly form of poison gas.

. . .

The report confirms the worst fears of officials who are frustrated by the current policy, which is to avoid any direct military assistance to the Syrian rebels and limit U.S. aid to sporadic deliveries of humanitarian and communications equipment.

Many believe that Assad is testing U.S. red lines.
Of course, as Mr. Rogin notes, if the contents of this State Department Memo are true, then this puts the Obama Administration in a bit of a bind.  Back in August, President Obama declared that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would be a "red line" for the United States - one which could "significantly" alter his "calculus" as to what the US role in the Syrian conflict should be:


So . . . now the question becomes: what will the Administration's response be to this memo?  As the Obama Administration prepares to expand its air and logistical support for France's military foray into Mali, is there really any willingness to open up yet another can of worms by getting further involved in Syria - particularly when a significant majority of the American public disapproves of US involvement in the conflict?  We can only wait and see.

Alleged Chemical Weapon Activity:
According to Mr. Rogin's report on "The Cable," the chemical weapon allegedly deployed by the Assad regime is known as Agent 15 - a shorthand for 3-Quinuclidinyl Benzilate, which is also known by the even short acronym "BZ."  Unlike many chemical weapons - such as, for instance, mustard gas or sarin - BZ is an incapacitating, rather than toxic or lethal, agent.  Note that this does not mean that BZ is necessarily non-lethal.  As Charles Edward Stewart notes in his book Weapons of Mass Casualties and Terrorism Response: Handbook, even relatively low doses of BZ (and similar chemical agents) can result in death from hyperthermia - death from an elevated internal body temperature (e.g. the opposite of hypothermia):
Hyperthermia is a serious effect of poisoning with BZ. . . . . Death from relatively low doses of anticholinergies such as atropine or BZ has occurred as a result of the impairment of sweating. (pg. 69)
Because one of the effects of a significantly high dose of BZ is to cause the victim to slip into a coma, I imagine - but by no means know, since I'm not a doctor, chemist, or have any other specialized knowledge of medicine/chemicals - that a significantly high dose could, theoretically, induce a coma from which the victim would never awaken. ( <== This is conjecture; maybe someone more knowledgeable can correct me?)

However, for the most part, BZ is considered a non-lethal agent.  It has been tested on human subjects in the past, and, indeed, the US Army is alleged to have conducted BZ tests on human subjects during the '50s, '60s, and early '70s.  (NOTE: for the scientific-minded among you, here is a PDF copy of an Army research report on BZ chemical reactions, written in 1964).  For a somewhat medically technical, but otherwise fairly decent, description:
3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (QNB, BZ) is an anticholinergic agent that affects both the peripheral and central nervous systems (CNS). It is one of the most potent anticholinergic psychomimetics known, with only small doses necessary to produce incapacitation. ... Effects of QNB by any route of exposure are slow in onset and long in duration. The onset of action is approximately 1 hour, with peak effects occurring 8 hours postexposure. Symptoms gradually subside over 2-4 days. (National Library of Medicine, Toxicology Data Network)
Thus, as can be seen, the general medical description of BZ supposes an effect that is non-lethal and wears off in a matter of days.

BZ affects both the peripheral and central nervous systems of exposed victims, causing:

  • Peripheral Nervous System: dryness of the mouth and skin, blurred vision, flushing of the skin, hyperthermia (as sweat glands cease function, see above)
  • Central Nervous System: mental status changes (delusions, hallucinations, disorientation, etc.), decline in physical coordination and slurred speech, variations in level of consciousness (allegedly ranging from drowsiness to coma)
All in all, BZ is an unpleasant and dangerous, but not necessarily deadly chemical weapon.  Its effectiveness lies in its ability to incapacitate one's enemies - preventing them from fighting by causing the symptoms described above.  

If, indeed, the Assad regime deployed BZ in Homs this past December, this is a terrible and significant escalation of the Syrian conflict.  However, we - and the Syrian opposition members affected - should consider ourselves lucky.  BZ/Agent 15 is by no means the most frightening weapon in Assad's chemical arsenal.  Assad has others that are far more deadly and far more gruesome. 

The real danger underlying the State Department memo described by Mr. Rogin is precisely what is mentioned in the article: the possibility that Assad could be "testing U.S. red lines."  If this is the case, and if the US response is not sufficiently sharp, then the next time Assad deploys chemical weapons, they may very well be more than mere incapacitating agents.

Monday, January 14, 2013

Today's Interesting Links

Here are some interesting links from today:

Syria:
Saudi Arabia:
Mali and the French Military Offensive:
Lots of links regarding France's military offensive in Mali . . . 
  • And here is another brief news clip from EuroNews:

Yemen:
Counter-Terrorism/Strategy:

Sunday, January 13, 2013

The War on Terror in Yemen: A Review of Gregory Johnsen's "The Last Refuge"

Several days ago, I finished reading a book that I had been looking forward to reading for some time: The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Yemen, by Gregory Johnsen.  Published last fall (November 2012), The Last Refuge had to be laid aside while I finished my law semester and studied for finals.  But the Christmas holiday gave me the time I needed and, now, here we are.  Because of the importance of the topics addressed in Mr. Johnsen's book and the fact that Yemen is an often-forgotten front in the United State's continuing campaign against al-Qaeda, I've decided to write a brief review of the book.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

It is likely that, if most Americans were asked to name the central fronts in the continuing battle against al-Qaeda, to the extent they would answer at all, they would cite Afghanistan or Pakistan.  Perhaps those who were up on recent news would name Mali.  But, after the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in a US drone strike in late September 2011 and the subsequent fading of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from the headlines, comparatively few would name Yemen, the oft-forgotten country occupying the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. 

At least one person, however, has not forgotten either Yemen or America's recent foreign policy forays in the country, nor underestimated the continuing significance of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  This person, Gregory Johnsen - Yemen expert, former Fulbright Fellow (in Yemen), and PhD candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University - has written a splendid book on the topic: The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia.  I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that Mr. Johnsen has written what is currently the preeminent book on al-Qaeda's expansion to Yemen; its early operations there; and its exploitation of the country's porous borders, tribal networks, and lack of strong central governance to expand its numbers and its strength.

Johnsen's story begins, like so many books about al-Qaeda, during the heyday of the Afghan-Soviet War, the 9-year conflict that proved to be the birthplace of the modern radical Islamist/jihadist movement.  Following the cast of characters that has become so familiar to counter-terrorism researchers - Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and, of course, Osama bin Laden, as well as lesser-known (but no less significant) figures like Yemeni cleric Abd al-Majid al-Zindani - Johnsen weaves a fine narrative of the importance of the Afghan War to the Arab World, and, specifically, the Yemen, of the 1980s.  Additionally, he provides a primer on the development of Osama bin Laden's violent ideology, an offshoot (and significant expansion) of his mentor Azzam's theory that violent jihad in defense of Muslim territory was fard al-ayn (الفرض العين) - an individual duty incumbent on all Muslims.

Equally important to the tale of al-Qaeda in Yemen is bin Laden's post-Afghanistan development of his terrorist organization and the progressive expansion of his ideology from merely battling "non-Islamic" intruders in the Arab world, to attacking the "apostate" governments aligned with the United States; from attacking U.S. interests in the region, to attacking American civilians (regardless of their gender, age, or military/civilian status) in the heart of the United States.  Bin Laden had little interest in the United States until the first Gulf War, when, with the acquiescence of the al-Saud monarchy, American troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of the American-led military campaign to expel Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait.  Indeed, as Johnsen describes, bin Laden's first post-Afghanistan plot involved jihad against the communist government of what was then South Yemen, directly to the south of bin Laden's home country of Saudi Arabia:
"In the months after Azzam's assassination [e.g. late 1989/early 1990], bin Laden and Fadhli [e.g. Tariq al-Fadhli, a veteran of bin Laden's cadre of "Arab Afghans"] sat up late in the evening . . . as they sketched out the future of jihad in bin Laden's apartment. They were both drawn to Yemen, the land of their father . . . . Said to be the Arab world's Afghanistan, Yemen was full of tribes and mountains, and, at least in the south, was ruled by Socialists. But mostly it was a blank map onto which the two young jihadis could project their ambitions." (Pgs. 17-18)
While America's so-called "occupation" of the "Land of the Two Holy Places" quickly turned bin Laden's attention away from Yemen back to Saudi Arabia and beyond the sea to the United States, the seeds of the al-Qaeda organization he had planted in Yemen, with Tariq al-Fadhli as his regional lieutenant, would continue to grow.

And it is precisely here that we find the crux of Johnsen's story: the growth, decimation, and resurrection of al-Qaeda in Yemen.  With a few exceptions (events like the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and names like Anwar al-Awlaki), this story is an unfamiliar one.  But it is a fascinating and incredibly informative tale - a tale that should be required reading for anyone interested in al-Qaeda, the War on Terror, or counter-terrorism studies generally.  Johnsen details how Yemen's internal politics allowed al-Qaeda to grow and thrive during the early 1990s, as Ali Abdullah Saleh (the President of North Yemen who had recently overseen Yemen's unification with his Southern counterpart, Ali Salim al-Bid) twice allied with Tariq al-Fadhli, bin Laden's lieutenant, in order to strengthen his own power in relation to his rivals in southern Yemen.  As Johnsen writes,
"Fadhli was loyal to bin Laden and the plan they had made together, but he was also bound to his father's tribe and their lands in the south. . . . . But for the moment, at least, Fadhli didn't have to choose. In the early 1990s, Salih and the jihadists were on the same side." (Pg. 22)
But, for Yemen's al-Qaeda branch, all good things had to come to an end.  While facing some internal difficulties during the mid and late '90s, with the turn of the century and the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole in October 2000 and the Twin Towers and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda in Yemen's grace period was over: the group was then firmly in the crosshairs of the United States.  Johnsen's depiction of the diplomatic back-and-forth between the US and Salih in the aftermath of 9/11, and the two allies' eventual destruction of al-Qaeda's Yemeni-based operations structure is a fascinating, and the final reversal of America and Yemen's initial success - the rebirth of al-Qaeda in Yemen as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula under the leadership of Islamists like Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Said Ali al-Shihri, and Anwar Awlaki - chilling in its implications.

Perhaps just as interesting as Johnsen's overarching history of al-Qaeda in Yemen is a comparatively brief interlude in the book's fourth chapter, "Faith and Wisdom," describing the tribulations of Ayman al-Zawahiri's terrorist organization, al-Jihad (aka Egyptian Islamic Jihad), during the mid-1990s and the open revolt of many of the organization's members in the wake of Zawahiri's decision to align al-Jihad with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda in 1998.  As Johnsen writes,
"Along with several other terrorist leaders, Zawahiri and bin Laden issued a fatwa entitled 'Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.' The declaration of war urged 'every Muslim' to kill Americans and Jews wherever they found them. Zawahiri's followers in Yemen were stunned. They hadn't been consulted. What was their boss doing? Criticism poured in from around the Middle East, Africa, and Europe as members of al-Jihad struggled to come to terms with Zawahiri's about-face. They were supposed to be fighting Mubarak's regime, and now Zawahiri wanted them to kill Americans.

. . . Convinced their leader had lost touch, al-Jihad operatives around the world started announcing their resignation." (Pg. 52-53)
I found this particularly interesting simply because I was unaware that the alliance between bin Laden and Zawahiri resulted in such discord within the jihadi community.

Anyway, to wrap it up, I would highly recommend The Last Refuge to anyone interested in counter-terrorism or security studies, Yemen, al-Qaeda, or the Middle East in general.  It is an excellent read, and well worth your time and money.

Friday, January 11, 2013

Vive le France: French Intervention in Mali

Today's big story is the French decision to militarily intervene in the Mali conflict (aka the "Tuareg Rebellion"), which, over the course of the past year, has left northern Mali ("Azawad") in the hands of several militant Islamist groups linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.  Throughout the summer, fall, and winter of 2012, these Islamist groups, Ansar Dine and Jamaat at-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad (the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), have consolidated their control over Azawad - turning on their erstwhile secular allies in the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA); imposing a strict, puritanical version of shari'a law; and engaging in tragic acts of cultural vandalism.  The Islamist rebels have also been pushing south, and, earlier this week, seized several towns in the central area of the fractured Malian state.  They are now threatening the military garrison town of Mopti, and several US aid groups in the area have been ordered to evacuate.  Here, courtesy of le Wikipedia, is a map depicting rebel gains as of yesterday, January 10:

Source: Wikipedia, "Northern Mali Conflict (2012 - Present)"

Now, into this maelstrom steps a man: a man who is willing to meet force with force and to stand firm in the face of terrorism.  Did George W. Bush hear the word "t'rrist", throw on his cowboy boots, and leap back onto his war horse?  No sir.  Allow me to introduce to you the new maestro of foreign intervention: Monsieur François Hollande, the socialist president of France.  Earlier today, Mr. Hollande gave a statement at the Élysée Palace in Paris, announcing France's decision to respond to the Malian government's request for military aid and stating that "French Armed Forces have, this afternoon, lent their support to Malian units to fight against these terrorist elements.  This operation will last for as long as necessary." Here is Mr. Hollande's full speech/statement: 



In the immediate wake of the French deployment, it has been reported that the Malian Army, backed by French forces, was able to retake the city of Konna from the Islamists.  

This story is, obviously, still developing.  I hope to write and comment on it further in the coming days, but, for now, here are a number of other stories about the French military intervention that you can look at:

Al Jazeera Video Report on Syria's Jabhat al-Nusra

This video is from a few days ago, but still interesting . . .


Bonus Video: additionally, I also found this video, which includes the Arabic-language (with English subtitles) of the Al-Jazeera video above, as well as a CNN report on Jabhat al-Nusra. Note that the final third of this video comes from Syria's al-Ikhbariya news channel and is *pure Syrian regime propaganda* - it contains such ridiculous gems as "[The US] is promoting the [al-Nusra] terror organization and producing a new justification for the US administration to continue its invasion of the countries of the world, under the pretense of the so-called 'War on Terror.' "  If I could have found another copy of the CNN report somewhere else, I would have posted that; but I couldn't, so . . .   

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Today's Interesting Links

Lots of interesting links today . . .

General Middle East:
Syria:
Turkey:
First, Morsi would like to see Omar Abdel-Rahman (aka the "Blind Sheik") freed, or, at least, granted better privileges/accommodations by the US:


Next, Morsi discusses his support for the Free Syrian Army and the other Syrian opposition groups fighting against Bashar al-Assad, as well as his support for trying Assad as a war criminal after the Syrian opposition is victorious:


Finally, Morsi discusses his opinion of President Obama and his plans to visit the United States before the end of the first quarter of this year:

Monday, January 7, 2013

Today's Interesting Links

And here are today's interesting links . . .

Saudi Arabia:
  • "Child Bride Married to Elderly Man Escapes After Wedding" (Riyadh Bureau).  This story has also been reported on the BBC and in Canada's National Post. 
  • I also found this interesting BBC Documentary on Saudi Arabia called Inside the Saudi Kingdom, in which the filmmakers follow Prince Saud bin Abdul Muhsin al-Saud (the governor of the Kingdom's Ha'il Province and one of the many, many grandsons of the Kingdom's founder and namesake Abdul Aziz ibn Saud).  After a quick internet search, I see that this is actually pretty old . . . from 2008, it seems.  But you know what?  I missed it then, so you get to see it now.

Counter-Terrorism:
Libya:

Sunday, January 6, 2013

Today's Interesting Links

Here's a crop of today's interesting links:

Counter-Terrorism/Terrorist Groups:
Syria:
Egypt:

Assad's Non-Conflict-Ending Speech

Today in Damascus, Bashar al-Assad gave a defiant speech at the city's opera house, ostensibly to offer a plan to resolve the ongoing conflict/civil war that has been roiling Syria for the past 20 months.  Assad's "plan," however, seemed largely divorced from the reality of the situation in Syria, the demands of the opposition, or the hopes of international observers.  As the New York Times notes:
"[Mr. Assad] offered no new acknowledgment of the gains by the rebels fighting against him, the excesses of his government or the aspirations of the Syrian people. Mr. Assad also ruled out talks with the armed opposition and pointedly ignored its central demand that he step down . . . ."
Indeed, Assad used most of his speech to attack the Syrian opposition, reiterating the regime's propaganda line that the opposition groups are made up of "foreigners," "terrorists," and "takfiris."  The Syrian dictator asserted that, "[b]ecause takfiri thought is strange to our country, they [the Syrian opposition] had to import it from abroad, whether in terrorists or thought [sic.] . . . Thus, takfiris, terrorists, Qaeda members calling themselves jihadis streamed from everywhere to command the combat operations on the ground."

Assad seemed to cut off the possibility of negotiations with most of the Syrian opposition groups, stating that "[w]e will have dialogue with all parties and individuals that did not sell our country to the foreigner" and wondering "with whom shall we dialogue - those who are carrying extremist thinking, and do not believe [in anything] except [] blood, killing and terrorism?"

In terms of ending the conflict, Assad offered a three-stage plan with various sub-parts.  We're just going to block-quote it from the somewhat jumbled English translation published by the Lebanon Daily Star:

"The first stage: First of all, regional and foreign countries must stop funding, arming and harbouring militants at the same time that gunmen stop all terrorist operations in order to ease the return of displaced Syrians to their original homes in safety and security.

Immediately after that, all military operations by our armed forces will stop, though they will reserve the right to respond in the case of attack on the security of the nation or residents or public and private property.

Second, a mechanism will be created to ensure commitment to all previous agreements for controlling the borders.

Third, the current government will immediately begin intensive communications with all elements of Syrian society, its parties and organisations...It will hold a national dialogue conference that all forces interested in a solution in Syria can participate in.

The second stage: First, the current government will hold a comprehensive national dialogue to reach a national pact that commits to the sovereignty of Syria and the unity and peace of its territory and the rejection of intervention in its affairs and the rejection of terrorism and violence in all its forms.

This pact is what will outline the political future of Syria and will propose a new constitutional and legal system along with its political and economic features. It will agree on new laws for parties, elections and local administration.

Second, the national pact will be sent for popular referendum.

Third, an expanded government will be formed, which includes all elements of Syrian society and it will implement the articles of the pact.

Fourth, the new constitution will be put to popular referendum and after it is confirmed, the expanded government will use the new agreed laws from the pact and the new constitution and will run new parliamentary elections.

The third stage will be the forming of a new government according to the constitution.

Second, a truth and reconciliation conference will be held and a general amnesty will be issued for all those arrested because of the events, in keeping with civil law.

Third will be the work towards rehabilitating infrastructure and rebuilding and compensation to citizens hurt by events."
Yeah . . . Anyway, in other words, if you were looking for a quick and/or comparatively bloodless plan for ending the Syrian conflict, you ain't going to find it here.  No surprises there.  But it really seems like Assad still hasn't read the writing on the wall and is willing to continue sticking to his guns - literally.  Expect more bloodshed, greater conflict, and a continuously rising death toll.  As expected, members of the Syrian opposition have sharply criticized the speech, and it is unlikely to have any immediate effect on the fighting/killing going on on the ground.

Also, here is the full video of the speech, courtesy of (*gag*) PressTV: